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 1 
CHAPTER I 
DID FINANCING CONSTRAINTS IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY AMPLIFY THE 
PANIC OF 1873? 
 
1.1    Introduction 
Waves of business failures are common features of economic downturns. Although these 
failures often reflect declines in real activity, they also have the potential to actively propagate 
real shocks. Bernanke (1983) proposes one channel through which firm defaults can amplify 
downturns, showing that defaults increased the cost of credit intermediation during the Great 
Depression. Following the Panic of 1873, business failures had the potential to affect real activity 
much more directly due to the undeveloped nature of bankruptcy procedures. At this time debt 
defaults of large corporate enterprises such as railroads were not governed by any bankruptcy 
laws. When creditors filed suit following a debt default, the judge would appoint a receiver 
charged with maintaining railroad operations while the railroad was reorganized. In theory, 
receivers should have been able to prevent any interruption in the firm's existing operations until 
the railroad was restructured. However, in practice receivers were often unable to engage in the 
kind of short-term borrowing needed to pay for working capital and maintain day-to-day 
operations. 
This inability to borrow was primarily due to the severe debt overhang that railroads 
faced following a default. Debt overhang refers to a situation where the magnitude of existing 
debt prevents an organization from engaging in further borrowing, even to fund profitable 
investments. Firms in this position are unable to borrow because the proceeds from any 
 2 
profitable activity would accrue to existing debt holders rather than new lenders.
1
 In the case of 
railroad receiverships, these financing constraints meant that receivers were often unable to 
maintain full operations of the railroad (Tufano 1997). The inefficiency of the receivership 
process would later lead to the development of equity receiverships and the widespread adoption 
of receiver's certificates in the 1880s, along with the 1898 passage of the Bankruptcy Act. 
Together, these legal innovations would strengthen receivers and streamline railroad 
reorganizations. However, in the absence of these tools, the wave of railroad defaults in 1873 and 
1874 disrupted transportation services as receivers struggled to maintain railroad service. This 
paper uses extensive data on railroads and national banks to demonstrate that railroad defaults 
significantly amplified the effects of the downturn on local economic activity following the 
Panic of 1873. 
The core of my approach is to link railroads to local banks through a measure of 
economic proximity based on the existing transportation network. The geographic separation of 
railroads makes it possible to trace the impact of individual failures on local economic activity. I 
use extensive GIS data on the transportation network around each bank to construct a “service 
area” that captures all railroad lines within a given transport cost of the bank. These service areas 
isolate the railroad lines which should be most important for economic activity in that bank's city 
or town. The fraction of railroads within each bank's service area that went into default captures 
the incidence of default within a bank's local area. Using this measure I find that railroad defaults 
amplified shocks to real activity and therefore to bank balance sheets. Although real activity 
stalled everywhere following the panic, railroads that defaulted on their bond debt faced severe 
financing constraints and cut their operations to a much greater extent, decreasing the amount of 
freight hauled and passengers transported. Banks relying on these railroads saw correspondingly 
                                                        
1
 See Myers (1977) for a formal treatment of debt overhang in a general theory of corporate borrowing. 
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larger declines in loans and deposits. In short, railroad defaults magnified the shocks to real 
activity in their local areas. 
To establish a causal link between railroad bond defaults and negative bank outcomes, it 
is necessary to control for the possibility that the downturn was simply more severe in some 
places than others. This heterogeneity would lead to weaker railroad demand in certain areas and 
simultaneously contribute to poor outcomes for local banks. To address this endogeneity, I 
instrument for railroad defaults with net earnings relative to debt in the fiscal year preceeding the 
panic. This measure captures how close each railroad was to default before the downturn. The 
results of this instrumentation strategy indicate that bond defaults led to steeper declines in 
economic activity as reflected in changes in the balance sheets of local banks. 
There are several reasons to focus on national bank balance sheets in order to capture 
localized real activity. Banks at this time financed commercial activity by making local, short-
term, self-liquidating loans. They made primarily local loans due to their inability to branch 
coupled with severe informational limitations. Banks also subscribed to the real bills doctrine, 
which held that loans should be short-term (a maximum of six months) and made only for self-
liquidating purposes (commercial activities that would directly produce the cash required to 
repay the loan). These banking practices meant that loan activity expanded and contracted in 
tandem with local economic activity. One final advantage of national bank balance sheets is that 
they were reported annually. This frequency allows me to observe balance sheets just prior to the 
panic and also one year after. Although the panic itself had a direct impact on the banking 
system, leading to an immediate deterioration of aggregate balance sheets, these effects 
disappear by the following year's observation. This suggests that the direct financial effects of 
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the panic were sufficiently short-lived and that variation in bank balance sheets in 1874 reflects 
variation in real activity. 
Importantly, national banks generally did not hold railroad bonds during this period. If 
national banks had held a significant portion of their assets in the form of railroad bonds, then 
bond defaults would have directly impacted banks regardless of whether or not railroad 
operations declined. This would confound the link between defaults, declining real activity, and 
deteriorating bank balance sheets. However, railroad bonds were generally bought by private 
banks centered in New York and wealthy individual investors. National banks, by contrast, were 
strongly incentivized to hold U.S. government bonds and held virtually no railroad bonds on 
their balance sheets. 
In the final section of this paper, I investigate the determinants of railroad defaults 
themselves. The results highlight the role that land grant policy played in increasing the 
probability of default. Under this type of policy, state and federal governments agreed to give 
large amounts of land to railroad companies in exchange for choosing a particular route. The 
primary purpose of this policy was to encourage railroad building where it would not have been 
privately profitable. As a result, these railroads generally ran through less populated areas and 
had significantly weaker cash flows. Also, as they built out they accumulated land along their 
route as an asset on their balance sheets. The market value of this land strongly depended on 
expectations for the completion of the railroad itself, with the land losing much of its value if the 
railroad running through it was not completed. 
In short, land grant railroads faced weaker demand and held assets that were highly 
sensitive to changing expectations for the railroad. As a result, land grant railroads were 
significantly more likely to default on their debts during the downturn. In this way, the subsidy 
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policies of state and federal governments contributed to the weaker financial condition of 
railroads, setting the stage for more debt defaults and a more severe downturn. This finding 
contributes to the historical literature on railroad overbuilding during this period. While evidence 
suggests that railroads were not built ahead of demand during the antebellum period (Fogel 1962 
and Atack et al. 2010), the postbellum period shows stronger signs of building ahead of demand 
(Mercer 1974). My results point to land grant policy as a primary driver of this overbuilding. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 1.2 discusses the historical context of the panic 
and the railroad industry. Section 1.3 describes the railroad and bank used. Section 1.4 details the 
construction of service areas and presents the primary results. Section 1.5 demonstrates the link 
between railroad defaults and land grant policy, providing an alternative explanation for the 
severity of the contraction. Section 1.6 concludes. 
1.2    Historical Background 
This section describes the key elements of the 1873 downturn and discusses the general 
features of railroad receivership at the time. The most important aspect of the downturn for this 
analysis was the central role of the railroad industry. The Panic of 1873 was triggered by the 
failure of the merchant bank Jay Cooke & Co. due to poor railroad investments. Jay Cooke had 
made large loans to the Northern Pacific Railroad to fund its construction, and his firm failed on 
September 18th following the inability to float additional bonds for the railroad. Runs began 
almost immediately on a number of New York banks, and the clearinghouse partially suspended 
cash payments. The stock market was shut down for the first time in its history.
2
 The panic itself 
was short-lived, with the stock market reopening after ten days and currency flowing back into 
New York from country banks by mid-October. However, the downturn that followed (referred 
to by historians as the Long Depression) continued until 1879. 
                                                        
2
 For an in-depth account of the panic, see Wicker (2006). 
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This downturn was particularly harsh for the railroad industry. Sprague (1907), in his 
seminal history of the banking panics during this period, writes that in the run-up to the panic 
“the most serious weakness was disclosed in connection with railroad building. Bonds often sold 
at a heavy discount had provided the means for building many roads which were in advance of 
any considerable population, and whose traffic proved insufficient to meet fixed charges.” He 
drew particular attention to the collapse in railroad construction, noting that for many railroads 
“construction had to be discontinued altogether, leaving a large mileage [of rail] connecting 
nothing in particular.” The data on industrial production and railroad construction support his 
assessment. Machinery production declined by 18% in the year following the panic, and declined 
by a total of 37% by 1877 (Davis 2004). Railroad construction collapsed; while the total miles of 
rail had grown by 9% per year following the Civil War, this growth fell to 3% per year from 
1873 to 1878.
3
 The construction of railroads was financed primarily through the issuance of 
bonds, many of which had been sold in Europe during an investment boom. However, the stock 
market in Vienna crashed in May of 1873, and the appetite for railroad bonds from European 
investors quickly disappeared. In the face of these events, railroads found it increasingly hard to 
issue new debt and continue railroad construction. 
The collapse in transportation demand and the inability to float new bonds resulted in a 
huge number of railroad defaults following the panic. In late 1873 and 1874, nearly a quarter of 
all railroad companies with outstanding bonds defaulted on this debt.
4
 Although some railroads 
subsequently covered their missed debt payments and became solvent, most lingered in default 
and went into receivership. Figure 1 shows the extent of railroad bond defaults following the 
panic. Railroads highlighted in red are those that defaulted on their bond debt and remained in 
                                                        
3
 Source: The Railroad Journal, 1880 
4
 Source: The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 1874 p.174 
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delinquency through 1875. Although scattered defaults occurred in the northeast, the majority of 
railroad defaults were concentrated in the Midwest, the Plains, and the South. 
The absence of adequate procedures for resolving defaults meant that receivers faced 
significant financing constraints when trying to maintain rail service. Railroads in receivership 
typically needed to raise substantial cash in order to meet current expenses and fund new 
investments. However, these firms faced the problem of debt overhang, whereby their existing 
debt was so large that they could not easily borrow money even to fund profitable endeavors. 
Because the legal rights of prior lenders were particularly strong, new potential lenders ran the 
risk that any profit made from a new loan would be used to pay existing debtors rather than the 
new lenders. Due to these issues, receivers often were not able to raise the short-term capital 
necessary to maintain full rail service, continue construction, or make new investments. 
These large inefficiencies would lead to the development of important new tools and practices 
for restructuring firms. For instance, receiver's certificates provided the standard mechanism by 
which railroads and courts dealt with the issue of debt overhang (Tufano 1997). These 
certificates superseded all other debt obligations, so purchasers of receiver's certificates did not 
need to worry about the extent of prior debt. This new tool allowed receivers to raise short-term 
capital by offering a credible repayment mechanism to new lenders. Although these certificates 
appeared sporadically as early as 1872, they did not enter widespread use until the late 1880s. 
When a judge allowed receivers to issue these certificates, he or she was unilaterally altering the 
terms of prior contracts between the railroad and previous borrowers. This raised significant 
constitutional issues, and receiver's certificates were not officially ruled as constitutional until a 
Supreme Court case in 1886. With their constitutionality undecided in 1873, they were generally 
unavailable to receivers, who were therefore unable to raise the working capital needed to 
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maintain full operation of the railroad. In the following sections, I demonstrate that not only did 
railroad bond defaults lead to a halt in construction on those lines, but they also resulted in 
diminished service for lines that were already operating. Ultimately, these railroad defaults 
exacerbated declines in real activity. 
1.3   Data 
This paper uses two primary sets of data: GIS data on the locations of all railroads and 
national banks, and bank balance sheet data for all national banks prior to and following the 
downturn. Data on national bank balance sheets comes from the Reports of the Comptroller of 
the Currency. The Comptroller reports contain annual bank balance sheet data on all national 
banks in operation during each year.
5
 The 1873 data reflect bank balance sheets as of September 
12, immediately preceding the failure of Jay Cooke and Co. and the onset of the crisis. Data from 
1874 captures the state of banks' balance sheets over a year later, in October of that year. This 
timing is beneficial because the purely financial effect of the panic on banks appears to be gone. 
From September to December of 1873 aggregate loans and deposits fell by 9% and 13% 
respectively, likely reflecting lingering financial effects from the panic itself. However, by 
October of 1874 both loans and deposits were slightly above their pre-panic levels. Bank data at 
this point should therefore reflect variations in real activity between different areas rather than 
the aggregate effects of the panic on the banking system. 
The data on the contemporary railroad network comes from a transportation GIS database 
created by Jeremy Atack (2015). This database contains precise information on the location of 
railroad lines in 1872, along with other transportation information on rivers and canals. Figure 2 
shows the full set of transportation data available for 1872 (railroads in green and bolded, rivers 
                                                        
5
 Although state banks would eventually become more numerous than national banks, at this point they were still 
relatively insignificant (there were 277 state banks in operation in 1873, as opposed to 1968 national banks). Thus, 
the data from national banks should be sufficient to characterize the effects of this crisis. 
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and canals in blue) as well as the location of every national bank. Dots indicate cities that had at 
least one national bank. 
This dataset was created using current satellite imagery to identify the historical paths of 
rail lines. Thus, it represents a significant improvement in accuracy over historical maps of 
railroads, which were very approximate and often contained outright errors. Although this 
dataset contains the precise locations of all rail lines in 1872, it does not indicate which 
companies actually operated which lines of track at the time of the panic. Thus, for every rail line 
in the data, I determined to the extent possible which company operated the track in 1873. 
Information on which firms operated particular routes comes from the American Railroad 
Journal (1873) and Poor's Manual of Railroads (1873). This allows me to match the 
geographical location of rail lines with financial data on railroad companies. Railroad firm data 
such as gross and net earnings, operating expenses, and amount of funded debt comes from 
Poor's Manual of Railroads (1873-1875). Data on railroad bond defaults comes from the 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle (1875). The Chronicle separates railroads that remained 
delinquent on their debt through 1875 from railroads that defaulted but either caught up with 
their debt payments debts or settled directly with bondholders. Railroads in this second group are 
not considered to be in default for the purpose of this analysis. 
In section 1.5, I turn to the role of land grants in promoting riskier railroad building and 
contributing to railroad defaults. The information on land grants comes from a letter from the 
Secretary of the Interior to the House of Representatives documenting a comprehensive list of 
federal land grants given to particular railroads.
6
 Railroad lines that received land grants are 
shown in brown in Figure 3. 
                                                        
6
 Source: United States. Cong. House. Committee on Public Lands, C. Delano. 42 Cong., 2 sess. H. Rept. 43. 
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Clearly, railroads that received land grants are concentrated in the Midwest, South, and West. 
This reflects the use of land grants to incentivize building in relatively unpopulated areas that 
would otherwise have been unprofitable. This data will be used to explore the relationship 
between land grants and vulnerability to default. County-level data on population and economic 
activity comes from the 1870 Census data as found in Haines (2004). 
1.4   Service Areas and Main Results 
This section describes the construction of service areas that link railroads to local banks 
through the transportation network, and also uses this tool in bank-level and railroad-level 
regressions to capture the impact of railroad defaults. These service areas are designed to 
accurately capture economic proximity between particular railroads and particular banks using 
the transportation network available at the time, thus significantly improving on simple 
geographic proximity. Regression results using these service areas indicate that bond defaults 
resulted in local banks making fewer loans, attracting fewer deposits, and keeping more cash in 
reserve. Further, a set of regressions at the railroad level shows that defaults are associated with a 
large drop in railroad operations. These findings together highlight the role of railroad defaults in 
amplifying real shocks by disrupting transportation services. 
1.4.1  Service areas 
The creation of service areas provides the vital link between railroads and local banks. A 
service area consists of the portion of the national rail network that falls within a certain 
maximum transportation cost of a particular city.
7
 Figures 4 and 5 show the rail lines that lie 
within the service areas of four particular cities (defined by a maximum transport cost of $.50 per 
ton). These figures demonstrate the contrast that service areas capture between cities with many 
                                                        
7
 In calculating transportation costs, I follow Fogel (1962) and Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) in setting the 
railroad transportation costs to 0.63 cents per ton-mile and water transportation costs to 0.49 cents per ton-mile. 
Transportation by wagon (in the absence of any other transportation option) costs 23.1 cents per ton-mile. 
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relevant railroad lines and cities with only several. Figure 4 shows the railroad lines included in 
the service areas for New York City and Ithaca, NY, while figure 5 shows the same for Chicago, 
IL and Iowa City, IA. The service areas around New York City and Chicago capture the larger 
number of lines relevant to those cities. If only one of these lines were to go through default, the 
impact on local banks should be relatively small due to the richness of the overall network. 
Ithaca and Iowa City, by contrast, are dominated by only a few proximate railroad lines. A single 
railroad default in these areas would have a much larger potential to disrupt local economic 
activity. 
Using this method, I define an area of particular economic relevance for all cities 
containing national banks. In the following results, service areas are defined by a maximum 
transport cost of $.50 per ton. This radius captures the railroads of immediate importance without 
including too many far-out railroads to be of use. 
1.4.2 Main results: Railroad defaults and declining banking activity 
Using the service areas defined above, I show here that railroad bond defaults had 
significant negative effects on local banks in terms of loans, deposits, and excess reserves. 
However, there is a potential for endogeneity in relating railroad defaults to declining real 
activity. If the downturn were worse in some areas than others for unobservable reasons, 
railroads in those areas would have been more likely to default and local banks would fare 
worse, but this would not imply a causal relationship between bond defaults and declining real 
activity. In order to address this issue, I instrument for railroad bond defaults with each railroad's 
ratio of net earnings to bonded debt in the fiscal year prior to the downturn. The earnings to debt 
ratio captures the extent to which a railroad could still cover its bond payments even in the face 
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of declining demand. Thus, it should be correlated with railroad defaults but not with the 
intensity of the downturn in any particular area. 
The bank-level regressions in columns 4-6 of table 1 use this instrumentation strategy. 
The precise variable of interest is the percentage of railroad miles within each bank's service area 
that defaulted on their bond debt following the panic. The instrument for this variable is the 
average ratio of net earnings to bonded debt prior to the panic for railroads within the service 
area (each railroad's ratio is weighted by the number of miles of rail it has within the service 
area). Table 2 shows the first stage regressions from this IV strategy. These results confirm that 
earnings to debt ratios strongly predict the incidence of default in the areas around each bank. 
The dependent variables in table 1 are the percentage change in loans, deposits, and excess 
reserves at the bank level, measured from immediately prior to the panic to one year later. If 
economic activity declines in a particular area, local banks should see their loans and deposits 
fall, while their excess reserves should rise as lending opportunities decrease and these banks 
shore up their balance sheets. The measures of loans and deposits come directly from the balance 
sheets. Excess reserves are easily calculated for country banks but not for banks in reserve and 
central reserve cities such as Boston, Philadelphia, and New York (87% of all banks were 
country banks). Because of this, the regression using excess reserves (column 3 in table 1) 
includes only banks outside of reserve and central reserve cities.
8
 
The regressions also contain a number of bank balance sheet variables that control for 
other potentially important factors. Total assets captures the overall size of the bank. The initial 
                                                        
8
 For banks in reserve and central reserve cities, some (but not all) of their interbank deposits qualified as reserves. 
Thus it is impossible to determine their total reserves from their balance sheets. Country banks were required to hold 
in reserve 15% of their deposits, but 3/5 of this amount could be held as deposits in reserve city banks. Because 
these interbank deposits paid interest, country banks typically took full advantage of this. Thus, the typical 
requirement for deposits held within the bank was 6%. Excess reserves are therefore defined as total reserves minus 
6% of deposits. 
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level of loans, deposits, and reserves are also included relative to assets. The capitalization of the 
bank might also affect how well it fared following the panic, so this is included as well. 
Indicators for the type of bank (county, reserve city, or central reserve city) are also included, as 
different types faced different regulatory standards. Standard errors are clustered at the city level 
(the results are robust to clustering at the county and state level). 
Table 1 shows the results from this specification. Columns 1-3 show the naive OLS 
regressions which do not use any instrumentation strategy. The regressions in columns 4-6 
instrument for railroad defaults with net earnings to debt ratios. In both specifications, railroad 
defaults are associated with significantly worse outcomes for banks in terms of loans, deposits, 
and excess reserves. However, the coefficients on railroad defaults are significantly larger in the 
IV specification. These results indicate that in areas where half of the local railroad miles went 
into default, banks saw a nearly 10% drop in loans, a 19% drop in deposits, and an increase in 
excess reserves of over 80% relative to banks that had no local railroad defaults. The variation in 
exposure to defaults between banks is quite large: 37% of the banks in the sample saw over half 
of their local railroads default, while 34% of banks saw no local defaults at all. These findings 
strongly support the view that railroad defaults amplified the effects of the downturn.  
Turning to the other variables, it seems that larger banks show a correspondingly larger 
decrease in loans. As expected, better capitalized banks fare better. Loans and reserves also show 
a statistically significant convergence effect, but deposits do not. Banks in reserve cities and in 
the central reserve cities also fared better, as currency flowed into the major banking cities once 
the panic was over. 
Table 2 shows the first stage regression for the IV strategy used in table 1. As expected, a 
higher ratio of net earnings to debt in a particular area is strongly correlated with a lower 
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incidence of railroad default. These results support the use of earnings to debt ratios as an 
instrument for railroad defaults. 
The link between railroad bond defaults and bank outcomes would be more difficult to 
interpret if national banks directly held railroad bonds on their own balance sheets. In particular, 
if banks held the bonds of their local railroads as assets, these banks would suffer from defaults 
even without a disruption in transportation. However, in actuality national banks held virtually 
no railroad bonds during this period. The average national bank held 1.5% of its assets as “other 
stocks, bonds, and mortgages,” of which railroad bonds were only a part. Railroad bonds were 
primarily purchased by large private banks in New York and by wealthy individual investors. 
National banks were strongly incentivized to hold government bonds instead and held virtually 
no railroad bonds.  
Nevertheless, the importance of this channel can be tested by excluding banks with a high 
percentage of their assets held as other stocks, bonds, and mortgages. The results in table 1 are 
robust to the exclusion of all banks with more than 5% of their assets held in this category. Thus, 
national bank ownership of railroad bonds does not drive the results in table 1. This further 
supports the hypothesis that railroad defaults affected banks primarily through the disruption of 
transportation services. 
1.4.3 Measuring the declining activity of financially-constrained railroads 
The intuition for the results in section 1.4.2 is that following a railroad default, receivers 
were financially constrained and unable to fully maintain the operations of the railroad. This 
section provides support for this assertion by examining how railroad operations changed as 
railroads defaulted. The regressions in table 3 use data on railroad operating expenses to identify 
the effect of a default. Railroad operating expenses are the best way to characterize railroad 
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operations because they are available for the majority of railroads and provide a summary 
measure of the total amount of freight hauled and passengers transported by the railroad over its 
fiscal year. For the sample of railroads where data on passengers carried and freight hauled is 
also available, the correlation between these measures and operating expenses is very high 
(correlation coefficient of .7 and .8 respectively). 
In order to properly isolate the impact of defaults on operations, it would be ideal to 
characterize exogenous changes in railroad demand from year to year. However, production data 
(either manufacturing or agricultural) is not available at the annual level during this time period. 
Instead, I use yearly meteorological data on drought conditions to capture exogenous changes in 
agricultural demand for railroad services. The Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) uses 
historical precipitation and air temperature data to construct a measure of drought conditions 
relative to the usual climate for land areas in a 2.5° by 2.5° grid (Dai et al. 2004). The index 
ranges from -10 (extreme drought) to +10 (extremely wetness) and provides an important source 
of exogenous variation in farm output. Table 3 therefore includes a drought measure calculated 
from the Palmer index for every railroad in the sample. I follow Chabot and Moul (2014) in 
ignoring wetter-than-average years and constructing a drought measure captured by 
𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑗,𝑡 = (𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑗,𝑡|𝑃𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑗,𝑡 > 0)
2 for each land area j in the grid.
9
 For each railroad, I 
average the drought measures for the counties in which the railroad operated. This summary 
measure should capture at least some of the exogenous changes in railroad demand from year to 
year, better isolating the impact of a default from other sources of variation. 
Table 3 shows the results of a panel regression that explains railroad operating expenses 
by year with railroad defaults, the measure of drought along the rail line and fixed effects. The 
                                                        
9
 Unlike Chabot and Moul (2014), I am trying to capture year by year variations in farming output, so I do not 
calculate a weighted average over a five year span. 
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dependent variable is the log of operating expenses for the railroad in a given year, which is 
regressed against an indicator variable Default that takes a value of 1 if the railroad defaulted on 
its debt in that particular year and 0 otherwise. Column 1 also includes the drought measure and 
railroad fixed effects. Column 2 includes year fixed effects as well. 
The results indicate that railroad defaults are strongly associated with declining operating 
expenses. For the average railroad, a debt default is associated with a 19% drop in operating 
expenses in that period. When year fixed effects are included, the impact of default decreases to 
15%. In either specification, the impact of default is clearly large enough to negatively affect the 
balance sheets of local banks. Drought conditions are also associated with lower levels of 
railroad operations, although this effect is not statistically significant when year fixed effects are 
included.  
One important caveat is that a number of railroads that went through default subsequently 
declined to publish any statements of earnings or operations. These railroads cannot be included 
in the above regression. However, it seems likely that these railroads fared even worse than those 
that did report their operations following a default (hence the decision not to report). If this were 
the case, then the results in table 3 would actually understate the true impact of default on firm 
operations. 
This empirical link between default and declining operating expenses supports the 
intuition behind the results in section 1.4.2. Receivers that were unable to engage in short-term 
borrowing were forced to cut back on railroad operations that would have otherwise been 
profitable. This provides an explanation for the subsequent decline in real activity in these areas, 
as reflected in the loans, deposits, and reserves of local banks. 
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1.5   Causes of railroad bond defaults 
The sheer magnitude of the downturn in the railroad industry, both in terms of the 
number of defaults and the drop in construction, is striking. This section addresses the more 
fundamental question of why so many railroads were in such a weak financial position in the first 
place. The results indicate that land grant policy significantly contributed to the weakness of 
railroads' cash flow and their likelihood of default. Theoretically, land grants can lead to unsound 
railroads for two reasons. First, land grants encourage building in relatively unpopulated areas 
with weaker fundamental demand for transportation services. As a result, land grant railroads 
would have lower net earnings relative to debt and be closer to default. Second, land grants result 
in the holding of assets (specifically, land along the route) that would drop sharply in value with 
declining expectations for the railroad. Land along a railroad is clearly more valuable if that 
railroad is completed than if construction is halted due to a default. When expectations about a 
particular land grant railroad suddenly reverse, the resale value of its assets drops significantly, 
harming its financial position. In actuality, land grant railroads did derive a significant portion of 
their revenue from land sales. Thus, a decline in the value of their land hurt their revenue stream 
directly. For both of these reasons, land grant policy provides an economic explanation for the 
high number of defaults and demonstrates that government policy contributed to the construction 
of unsound railroads, amplifying the severity of the downturn. 
Table 4 shows the results of probit regressions on the determinants of default for railroad 
companies. The dependent variable Default takes a value of 1 if the railroad defaulted on at least 
one bond and 0 otherwise. 30% of railroad companies in the sample defaulted on at least one 
bond. The main variable of interest is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for land grant 
railroads and 0 otherwise. Also included in the first column are the railroad's ratio of debt to 
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capital and an indicator variable for whether the railroad's trunk line was completed or still under 
construction. All coefficients shown are marginal effects. The first specification indicates that 
land grant railroads were 22% more likely to default on their debt over this period relative to 
other railroads. Because land grant railroads were generally built in less-populated areas, some of 
this effect likely comes from the fact that these railroads had weaker cash flows than others. 
The second column also includes a measure for the average population density for counties along 
each railroad's route. In this specification, higher population density does indeed decrease the 
probability of default. The coefficient on the Default variable is also significantly lower, 
although it still indicates a 15% higher probability of default for land grant railroads (significant 
at the 10% level). Although population density accounts for a portion of the effect of land grants, 
it does not account for all of it. This suggests that the role of land as an asset held by the railroads 
may have also played a role in increasing the probability of default, declining in value when 
expectations for railroad construction change. 
The third column includes additional county-level control variables for average output in 
1870 from the census data. Generally speaking, when all county-level variables are included 
together, they are not statistically significant. However, the impact of the land grant indicator is 
robust to these specifications. The fourth column also includes a regional (western) indicator in 
addition to the land grant variable. This regression is intended to test for the possibility that the 
significance of the land grant indicator comes from a purely regional effect, given that the vast 
majority of land grant railroads are in the west. This variable takes a value of 1 if the railroad 
runs west of the Mississippi and 0 otherwise. The results indicate that the impact of land grants is 
not simply driven by a regional effect. 
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As a point of contrast to land grant policy, the fifth column instead includes an indicator 
variable for whether or not the railroad was a state aid railroad. State aid in this context means 
that the railroad received support in the form of direct loans or explicit debt guarantees from state 
governments. For example, the bonds of the Alabama and Chattanooga Railroad were guaranteed 
by the state of Alabama, thus significantly reducing the risk of default to bondholders. Because 
this form of government policy explicitly secured railroad debt (rather than encouraging building 
in riskier areas and letting these railroads fail), it had the opposite impact of land grants on the 
probability of default. The results in column 5 indicate that state aid railroads were significantly 
less likely to default. Thus, the type of government support for railroads made a huge difference. 
While explicit government guarantees of railroad debt made that debt less risky, land grant 
policy resulted in railroads that were more likely to default. 
Table 5 reports the results from using a linear probability model for railroad defaults 
rather than a probit model. The results do not seem to be driven by the particular choice of 
model, as the coefficients are similar in sign and magnitude to those of the probit regressions in 
table 4. The linear probability models predict that land grant railroads are between 18% and 23% 
more likely to default than non-land grant railroads. 
The findings in this section indicate that railroad defaults during this downturn were 
partially attributable to the overextension of land grant railroads into unpopulated areas, and to 
the fragility of these railroads. This supports the view expressed in Mercer (1974) that after the 
Civil War land grant railroads were likely to be built ahead of demand. Overbuilding left them in 
a weaker financial position and more vulnerable to default in response to declining demand for 
transportation. 
1.6   Conclusion 
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Although today firm bankruptcies are governed by laws designed to facilitate 
restructuring, in the 1870s the process of restructuring railroads lacked several crucial 
components that would have made it more efficient. In particular, equity receiverships had not 
yet been fully developed and receiver's certificates were not yet widely used. The result was that 
railroads in receivership were severely financially constrained, and often could not obtain the 
working capital necessary to fully meet the demand for their transportation services. Railroads in 
default cut back on operating expenses by over 15%, and banks in those areas saw large declines 
in loans and deposits as well as sharp increases in excess reserves. In short, railroad bond 
defaults amplified the general downturn following the Panic of 1873, and contributed to the 
length and depth of the Long Depression. 
The number of defaults of major railroads was without precedent in 1873. Although there 
had been previous nationwide panics in 1837 and 1857, these panics did not result in waves of 
railroad bond defaults. This was primarily because railroads were financed mainly through 
equity rather than debt prior to the Civil War (Tufano 1997). The Panic of 1873 was the first 
time in U.S. history that so many railroads went through large and expensive debt defaults. The 
costs of these failures prompted the flurry of bankruptcy innovations that followed, ultimately 
leading to a more efficient process for funding and restructuring large bankrupt firms. 
The sheer extent of railroad defaults following the panic can be partially explained by 
government policy. Specifically, land grants encouraged unsound railroad building and thus 
contributed to the severity of the downturn. Previous explanations for the origins of the Panic of 
1873 have emphasized various causes. Kindleberger (1990) lists 13 distinct contributing factors, 
but focuses primarily on the speculative frenzy in Germany and Austria resulting from the 
French Indemnity in 1871-72 (a massive post-war payment from France to Germany, triggering 
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inflation and speculation). In his view, the appetite for U.S. railroad bonds in these countries 
following this stimulus set up an inevitable boom and bust cycle in U.S. railroads. In contrast, 
Bordo (1990) argues that the U.S.'s flexible exchange rate should have insulated it from 
international effects, and therefore that the U.S. crisis had domestic origins. He instead 
emphasizes the secular decline in the world's production of gold beginning in 1871. This decline 
led to strong downward pressure on prices and the subsequent failure of investments that were 
predicated on rising prices. My work suggests that U.S. land grant policy also contributed to the 
severity of the downturn. Land grants encouraged railroads to be overbuilt relative to demand 
and also resulted in railroads holding assets (land along the route) whose value was highly 
dependent on positive expectations for the economy and for the railroad in particular. This set the 
stage for these railroads to default at higher rates, and for the downturn to be more severe than it 
otherwise would have been. 
Railroads in default shown bold and in red.
Source: Commercial and Financial Chronicle (1875) p. 174 and Poor’s Manual of Railroads (1873)
Figure 1. Railroad bond defaults from September 1873 to October 1874
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Railroads bold and in green, rivers and canals in blue. Dots indicate national banks.
Source: Atack, Jeremy. ”Historical Geographic Information Systems (GIS) database of U.S. Railroads for
1872”.
Figure 2. Full transportation network and all national banks
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Land grant railroads shown bold and in brown.
Source: United States. Cong. House. Committee on Public Lands, C. Delano. 42 Cong., 2 sess. H. Rept.
43.
Figure 3. Land grant railroads
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Figure 4. Example service areas around New York City and Ithaca
Railroad lines within each city’s service area are shown in purple and bolded. All service areas shown here
use a maximum transportation cost of $.50 per ton.
Figure 5. Example service areas around Chicago and Iowa City
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Table 1. Railroad defaults and banking outcomes (2SLS)
Dependent variable: Percent change in banking variables from 1873 to 1874
Naive OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loans Deposits Excess reserves Loans Deposits Excess reserves
Percent of railroad miles -0.132∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ 0.440∗ -0.192∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗ 1.683∗∗∗
within service area in default (-5.20) (-4.00) (1.76) (-2.18) (-2.65) (3.86)
ln(Assets) -0.0196∗∗∗ 0.0248∗∗ -0.0703 -0.0219∗∗∗ 0.0170 -0.0230
(-2.66) (2.35) (-1.54) (-2.72) (1.38) (-0.49)
Capital/assets 0.390∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ -1.050∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ -0.778
(7.06) (3.05) (-2.05) (6.04) (3.07) (-1.55)
Loans/assets -0.121∗∗ -0.128∗∗
(-2.24) (-2.25)
Deposits/assets -0.0121 0.0229
(-0.12) (0.24)
Reserves/assets -1.901 -3.177∗∗
(-1.41) (-2.19)
Reserve city indicator 0.0814∗∗∗ 0.0524∗∗ 0.0808∗∗∗ 0.0498∗
(3.80) (2.07) (3.75) (1.84)
Central reserve city indicator 0.153∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(7.41) (6.21) (7.45) (6.34)
Constant 0.195∗ -0.472∗∗∗ 1.407∗ 0.242∗∗ -0.355∗ 0.613
(1.95) (-2.64) (1.92) (1.97) (-1.72) (0.83)
Observations 1747 1744 1514 1746 1743 1513
R2 0.088 0.046 0.011
F − First stage 70.661 68.151 63.569
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2. First stage of IV
Dependent variable: Percent of railroad miles within service area in default
(1) (2) (3)
Average earnings to debt ratio -0.312∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.314∗∗∗
for railroads in service area (-8.41) (-8.26) (-7.97)
ln(Assets) -0.0187∗∗∗ -0.0200∗∗∗ -0.0189∗∗
(-2.68) (-2.83) (-2.28)
Capital/assets -0.176∗∗∗ -0.00579 -0.124∗∗
(-3.34) (-0.09) (-2.08)
Loans/assets -0.0891∗
(-1.65)
Deposits/assets 0.124∗∗
(2.39)
Reserves/assets 0.836∗∗∗
(3.59)
Reserve city indicator -0.0342 -0.0346
(-1.48) (-1.51)
Central reserve city indicator 0.0262 0.0285
(1.43) (1.56)
Constant 0.568∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗
(5.72) (4.57) (3.96)
Observations 1746 1743 1513
R2 0.177 0.179 0.175
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3. Defaults and Operating Expenses
Dependent variable: Log of operating expenses
(1) (2)
Default indicator -0.188∗∗∗ -0.154∗∗∗
(-3.51) (-2.66)
Drought measure -0.0143∗∗ -0.00651
(-2.14) (-0.90)
Railroad fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes
Constant 13.03∗∗∗ 12.95∗∗∗
(1802.75) (506.90)
R2 0.0384 0.0783
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 4. Determinants of railroad bond defaults (probit)
Dependent variable: Default indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Land grant indicator 0.224∗∗ 0.148∗ 0.185∗∗ 0.170∗
(2.57) (1.66) (2.02) (1.70)
Western indicator 0.0323
(0.38)
State aid railroad -0.198∗∗∗
(-2.83)
Construction indicator 0.237∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(3.31) (2.63) (2.63) (2.56) (2.66)
Bonded debt/capital 0.0429∗∗ 0.0401∗∗ 0.0398∗∗ 0.0396∗∗ 0.0369∗∗
(2.40) (2.31) (2.28) (2.26) (2.09)
Population density of -1.885∗∗ -0.772 -0.738 -1.450
counties along route (-2.49) (-0.93) (-0.90) (-1.47)
Farm output per capita of 0.104 0.101 0.0811
counties along route (1.53) (1.48) (1.14)
Manufacturing output per -0.0496 -0.0485 -0.0744∗
capita of counties along route (-1.29) (-1.26) (-1.71)
Drought measure of 0.170 0.141 0.108
counties along route (0.97) (0.73) (0.58)
Observations 272 272 272 272 249
Pseudo R2 0.0980 0.123 0.141 0.142 0.167
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 5. Determinants of railroad bond defaults (LPM)
Dependent variable: Default indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Land grant railroad 0.225∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.179∗
(2.62) (2.24) (2.25) (1.76)
Western indicator 0.0407
(0.42)
State aid indicator -0.206∗∗∗
(-2.71)
Construction indicator 0.228∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗ 0.182∗∗ 0.206∗∗
(3.19) (2.84) (2.54) (2.42) (2.59)
Bonded debt/capital 0.0287∗∗∗ 0.0276∗∗∗ 0.0268∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0251∗∗
(3.27) (3.16) (3.02) (2.83) (2.54)
Population density of -0.701∗∗∗ -0.136 -0.130 -0.348∗
counties along route (-3.51) (-0.71) (-0.69) (-1.68)
Farm output per capita of 0.0770 0.0743 0.0541
counties along route (1.39) (1.35) (0.93)
Manufacturing output per -0.0596∗ -0.0574∗ -0.0959∗∗∗
capita of counties along route (-1.88) (-1.78) (-2.80)
Drought measure of 0.202 0.161 0.143
counties along route (0.78) (0.58) (0.63)
Constant 0.184∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.139 0.138 0.486
(6.19) (6.16) (0.45) (0.45) (1.46)
Observations 272 272 272 272 249
R2 0.119 0.133 0.160 0.161 0.186
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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CHAPTER II 
REGULATORY COMPETITION, STATE BANKING, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN 
THE NATIONAL BANKING PERIOD 
 
2.1    Introduction 
The National Banking Acts of 1863 and 1864 inadvertently gave birth to the dual banking 
system in the U.S., under which banks can be chartered by either state authorities or the federal 
government. The advent of this system gave rise to an environment of strong regulatory 
competition, as both levels of government strove to raise revenue through issuing bank charters. 
Although this system encouraged the undercutting of several safety requirements for banks, it 
also facilitated a huge expansion in banking and an increase in banking competition (White 
1982). In this paper, I show that the free banking laws passed by various states in order to issue 
more bank charters decreased monopoly power and lowered returns in uncompetitive markets. 
Furthermore, I demonstrate that this expansion of state banking had a significant and positive 
impact on growth, particularly in the agricultural sector. The results highlight the beneficial 
nature of regulatory competition in the U.S. banking system. 
These findings contribute to the growing empirical literature on the link between 
financial development and economic growth. Following from the early theoretical contributions 
of Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon (1973), cross country studies such as King and Levine 
(1993) have established a robust link between measures of financial development and growth.
1
 
Looking specifically at the historical period after 1870, Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) find that 
the level of financial intermediation positively impacted growth for a set of countries including 
the U.S. However, the evidence for the positive impact of state-chartered banks during this 
                                                        
1
 See Levine (2005) for an overview of this literature. 
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period of U.S. history is less clear. Recent studies of nationally chartered banks (which tended to 
be larger and better capitalized than state banks) have generally found that they had positive 
impacts on growth. Jaremski (2014) finds that the entry of national banks immediately following 
the National Banking Acts furthered the growth of manufacturing capital and output, particularly 
in the Midwest. Fulford (2015), exploiting a discontinuity in bank entry from minimum capital 
requirements, finds that gaining a national bank resulted in an increase of county output per 
capita by around 10%. However, Jaremski and Rousseau (2013) find that banks chartered at the 
state level under free banking laws prior to the Civil War did not significantly contribute to 
growth. They conclude that because these banks were smaller and more likely to fail, they were 
not generally growth-promoting. Thus, it is not clear whether we would expect state banks, 
chartered under similar free banking laws during the National Banking period, to have 
significantly promoted growth. This paper provides evidence that they did, in fact, contribute to 
growth. 
The literature on the impact of state banking on competition in the banking system is 
more clear. Early work by Davis (1965) documents large interregional differences in the rate of 
return to national banks following the Civil War, which gradually disappeared over the following 
half-century. This suggests an inefficient and poorly integrated financial system in the early 
years of the National Banking period, which gradually became more efficient and nationally 
integrated. Subsequent work by Sylla (1969) argues that this inefficiency was due to the 
monopolistic nature of banking markets in rural areas. At the time, national banks faced high 
minimum capital requirements which effectively established a lower bound for the size of a 
national bank, restricting bank entry into small communities and rural areas. James (1976) 
specifically highlights the role of state banking laws passed in the 1880s and 1890s in 
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empowering state-chartered banks to compete with national banks and drive down returns. 
Furthermore, recent work by Sullivan (2009) has reinforced the hypothesis of the uncompetitive 
nature of the banking system in its early years. However, this work has generally examined the 
level of banking competition and return differentials at the state level. The first task of this paper 
is to characterize the impact of state banking on the returns to national banks at a more 
disaggregated level. To this end, I use the location of all national and state banks decennially 
from 1870 to 1900 to characterize the competitiveness of banking markets at the level of the city 
or town. Using the individual balance sheets of national banks, I estimate banking returns at the 
town level. I use these estimated returns to demonstrate that the expansion of state banking into 
these markets was the primary factor in driving down banking returns. 
Next, I quantify the role of free banking laws in facilitating the expansion of state 
banking. Prior to these laws, state banks were generally chartered by special legislative act or 
through general incorporation laws for all businesses. I quantify the impact of replacing these 
methods for chartering state banks with general free banking laws. Finally, I link this expansion 
of state banking to economic growth. To address the issue of simultaneity, I employ the strategy 
used in King and Levine (1993) and Bodenhorn (2000) and test the impact of initial financial 
variables on subsequent growth rates. I find that state banking had robust positive impacts on the 
growth of output and physical capital, particularly in the agricultural sector. The results of these 
regressions predict that there would have been about 1,400 fewer state banks in 1900 in the 
absence of state banking laws, and that this would have decreased agricultural output and capital 
by 1% in 1900. Thus, not only did regulatory competition decrease banking monopoly power, it 
had a significant impact on real economic activity. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 contains historical background on the dual 
banking system, the growth of state banking, and the free banking laws which enabled it. Section 
2.3 describes the data used, and in particular the method I use for estimating national banking 
returns at the market level using state level earnings data. Section 2.4 examines the link between 
state banking and the returns to national banking at the market level. Section 2.5 quantifies the 
impact of free banking laws on the growth of state banking, and section 2.6 estimates the impact 
of this expansion on economic growth. Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2   Historical Background 
Several aspects of the banking system during this period are significant for the analysis of 
this paper. In particular, the increasing role of state banks in the overall banking system during 
the 1880s and 1890s is central to my thesis. Prior to the Civil War, the primary business of 
banking had been to issue bank notes. Banks took deposits during this period, but the main 
source of revenue for banks was issuing notes which circulated as currency. The National Bank 
Acts of 1863 and 1864 created a national system for chartering banks and allowed all such banks 
to print interchangeable national bank notes. The goal was to create a uniform system of 
currency, rather than the patchwork of different bank notes of varying reliability that had existed 
previously. In order to ensure that state bank notes would no longer be used, Congress quickly 
imposed a 10% tax on the issuance of state bank notes. The result of this tax was the elimination 
of state bank notes, and nearly the elimination of state banks as well: fewer than 250 state banks 
existed 1868, compared to 1466 in 1863 (Grossman 2008). However, those state banks which did 
survive came to rely upon deposit banking as their main source of funds, and this business model 
coupled with certain competitive advantages over national banks led to a surge in state banking 
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in 1880s and 1890s. By 1900 the number of state-chartered banks exceeded that of national 
banks. Figure 1 shows a graph of the growth in both types of banks over this period. 
The competitive advantage enjoyed by state banks originated in the looser restrictions 
that they faced under state laws, compared to the relatively strict national banking regulations. 
National banks were prohibited from using real estate as collateral for loans, while most states 
permitted their banks to do so. The ability to engage in mortgage lending was particularly 
beneficial for state banks in agricultural areas, where land was the major asset of most potential 
borrowers. As previously mentioned, national banks also had high minimum capital 
requirements which prevented them from operating in smaller communities. In nearly every state 
with a state banking law, the established capital requirement for small towns was below that of 
national banks. Table 1 shows all of the state banking laws with minimum capital requirements 
that were less restrictive than the $50,000 national bank requirement.
2
 This list of free banking 
laws is compiled from information from Knox (1903), Barnett (1911), and various years of the 
Rand McNally International Bankers' Directory. 
The driving force behind the passage of these laws was regulatory competition between 
state governments and the national banking system (White 1982). States derived a significant 
portion of their income from chartering and taxing their own banks, and thus had an incentive to 
adopt more liberal policies of bank chartering. Eventually, this led to the federal government 
responding in kind with the Gold Standard Act of 1900. This legislation lowered the minimum 
capital requirement for national banks in the smallest communities from $50,000 to $25,000. 
Several successive rounds of regulatory easing by both levels of government followed over the 
next several decades. 
                                                        
2
 Minimum capital requirements often varied by the size of the community, with towns with smaller populations 
being allowed to have smaller banks. Column 3 in table 1 displays the lowest minimum capital allowed in the 
smallest town. 
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Over the same period as this resurgence in state banks, regional banking markets became 
more integrated and a truly national capital market was formed (Davis 1965). Immediately 
following the Civil War, the rates of return for national banks varied significantly by region, with 
high returns in the west and relatively low returns in the well-developed eastern financial 
markets. Although these return differentials persisted for decades, by the end of the decade they 
had decreased significantly. Figure 2 shows a three-year moving average of the rate of net 
earnings on earning assets for national banks outside of reserve and central reserve cities. The 
trend over the period is clearly convergence in the earnings between national banks in different 
regions, along with a gradual fall in the average net earnings rate. 
James (1976) argued that the increase in state banks noted in figure 1 played a key role in 
driving this convergence by eliminating monopoly power. In section 2.4, I provide additional 
evidence for this by looking at the relationship between monopoly and banking returns at the 
market level. 
2.3   Data 
Data on the location and balance sheet items of national banks comes from the Annual 
Reports of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, decennially from 1870 to 1900. 
Balance sheet variables for each bank are used to estimate net earnings at the bank level from 
similar data at the state and reserve city level, as described below. Data on the location and 
capital of state banks comes from the Merchants and bankers' almanac for 1870 and 1880, and 
the Rand McNally International Bankers Directory for 1890 and 1900. County-level variables, 
including data on economic growth and control variables used in the analysis, come from Haines 
(2004). In order to address the issue of changing county borders, counties are merged together if 
more than 15 square miles shifted from one county to another, using the county borders from 
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NHGIS. This ensures that the units in the 'county-level' analysis are consistent over time. Data on 
railroad, river, and canal access comes from the GIS databases created by Jeremy Atack (2015). 
Data on the population of individual cities or towns was collected from the U.S. Census for the 
years 1870-1900. 
Data on the net earnings of national banks also comes from the Comptroller's Annual 
Reports. Unfortunately, they are only reported at the state or reserve city level in these reports. In 
order to estimate returns at the bank level, I need to accomplish two things. First, I construct an 
estimate of the average return to loans at the state or reserve city level using estimates of the 
return rates on all other earning assets held by national banks (this closely follows James' 1978 
calculation of loan returns at the state/reserve city level). I then use these estimated rates of 
return for different types of earning assets in each state, along with individual bank balance sheet 
data on the holdings of different earning assets, to estimate returns at the bank level (and 
subsequently the market level). In doing so, I make various assumptions about the rates of return 
for different types of earning assets held by national banks, including government bonds, railroad 
bonds, and interbank balances. 
First, I calculate the average return to loans at the state or reserve city level by subtracting 
the returns on other earning assets held by banks from total net earnings. The major earning 
assets of national banks were loans and discounts, bonds for circulation and deposit, other stocks 
and bonds, and interbank balances. Similarly to James (1978), I calculate the net return on loans 
for each state or reserve city as 
𝑟𝐿𝐷𝑖 =
𝑁𝐸𝑖 − 𝑟𝑈𝑆(𝐵𝐶𝑖 + 𝐵𝐷𝑖) − 𝑟𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐵𝑖 − 𝑟𝑅𝑅𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐵𝑖
𝐿𝐷𝑖
 
where 𝑖 indexes states and reserve cities, 𝑟𝐿𝐷𝑖 is the net return to loans and discounts, 𝑁𝐸𝑖 is the 
net rate of earnings (total net earnings divided by earning assets), 𝐵𝐶𝑖 and 𝐵𝐷𝑖 are bonds held for 
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circulation and bonds for deposit, 𝐷𝐵𝑖 is due from banks, 𝑂𝑆𝐵𝑖 is other stocks and bonds (the 
primary component of which is assumed to be railroad bonds), and 𝐿𝐷𝑖 is total loans and 
discounts. 𝑟𝑈𝑆 is the average interest rate on government bonds, 𝑟𝐵𝐵is the average return on 
bankers' balances, and 𝑟𝑅𝑅𝐵is the interest rate on prime railroad bonds.
3
 This gives me an 
estimate of the net return to loans and discounts for national banks at the state or reserve city 
level. 
In order to approximate returns at the bank level, I use the average return to loans 
calculated above along with the returns to other earning assets to construct a weighted average of 
return to earning assets based on each individual bank's balance sheet. The formula for this is as 
follows: 
𝑟𝑗 =
𝑟𝐿𝐷𝑖𝐿𝐷𝑗 − 𝑟𝑈𝑆(𝐵𝐶𝑗 + 𝐵𝐷𝑗) − 𝑟𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐵𝑗 − 𝑟𝑅𝑅𝐵𝑂𝑆𝐵𝑗
𝐸𝐴𝑗
 
where 𝑗 now indexes individual banks, 𝐸𝐴𝑗 is the total earning assets of each bank, and the other 
variables are as above. This yields an individual return for each bank, based on an average rate of 
return for each type of earning asset along with the particular composition of earning assets held 
by each bank. In essence, I am using the composition of each bank's balance sheet along with the 
estimated return to loans in that bank's state, along with estimates of the return to the other 
earning assets, to approximate the earnings of that bank. I then aggregate these bank-level returns 
to the level of the market, in order to approximate returns in different banking markets. 
Of course, this is far from a perfect estimate of individual bank returns. Most importantly, 
it is unable to capture much of the variation in the return to loans between different banking 
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 The interest rate on government bonds comes from a weighted average of the bonds held as security for 
circulation. This rate is applied to both bonds held for circulation and bonds held for deposit, as the latter constitutes 
a significantly smaller portion of the total. The interest rate on prime railroad bonds comes from FRED’s series on 
railroad bond yields, 1857-1934. Following James (1976), I assume the average return on banker’s balances during 
the period from 1888 to 1900 was 2%. James (1978) gives a figure of 3-4% for the early 1870s. Thus, I use a rate of 
3.5% in 1870 and interpolate these values to get an interbank interest rate of 2.75% for 1880. 
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markets within the same state or reserve city. Most of the variation will come from the higher 
state-level loan returns in states where a higher percentage of national banks operate in a 
monopolistic environment. However, it is likely that banks in areas with higher loan returns 
skewed their balance sheets more towards loans, which are the highest return asset on average. 
This results in higher earnings for those banks relative to others within their state, even assuming 
the same rate of return on loans. Nevertheless, it is likely that my estimation understates the 
differences in returns between competitive and uncompetitive markets. If this is true, then my 
specification in the following section would provide a plausible lower bound on the importance 
of market structure, rather than an accurate point estimate. 
2.4   State Banking Expansion and Banking Returns 
The first task of this paper is to examine the role of state banking in equalizing banking 
returns across markets. I use the estimates of individual returns obtained above to look at the 
impact of monopoly power on banking returns in individual markets. Here, markets are defined 
as an independent census-enumerated city or town with at least one national bank. Table 2 shows 
the fraction of banking markets in each year in which only one national bank operated (national 
bank monopolies) and the fraction in which only one national bank operated and also no state 
banks were present (full monopolies). In the early years of the national banking period, the 
majority of banking markets were monopolies. Furthermore, nearly all bank markets which have 
only one national bank also have no state banks, meaning that almost all national banking 
monopolies were full monopolies in 1870. However, this situation changed significantly by the 
end of the century. At that point, only 29% of banking markets had only one national bank, and 
nearly half of these face competition from state banks. This decline in the prevalence of national 
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banking monopoly coincided with the convergence of banking returns in different regions over 
this period. 
The regressions in tables 3 and 4 formally analyze the relationship between monopolistic 
banking markets and bank returns. Table 3 examines the impact of national bank monopoly and 
the presence of state banks on earnings with indicator variables. Alternately, table 4 includes 
measures of the number of national and state banks in each market. Each measure reflects a 
different view of competition in banking. If banks competed primarily on price, then even a 
market with relatively few banks could be reasonably competitive, and the indicator variable for 
a banking monopoly would be the more appropriate measure of market power. However, if 
banks competed primarily on quantity, then the total number of banks would be more 
informative. To account for each of these possibilities, I analyze both measures. 
The baseline specification is as follows:  
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑆 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑖 indexes banking markets and 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is either an indicator variable for 
whether or not the market is a monopoly (in the first set of regressions) or a count variable for 
the number of banks in the market (in the second set). 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator 
variable which takes a value of 1 when the market is a reserve city or a central reserve city and 0 
otherwise. Banks in these markets were regulated differently than county banks. Most 
importantly, they faced different reserve requirements, and this could have impacted banking 
returns in these markets. Also, the earnings for these markets were reported separately from the 
states in which they existed in the Comptroller reports, so my estimates of the market-specific 
earnings will be more accurate for these cities. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 contains a number of control variables 
included in some of the specifications, most importantly the population of the particular city or 
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town. This is included to control for the overall size of the market. The percentage of output 
from the county that comes from farming (as opposed to manufacturing) and the urbanization 
rate in the county are also included as factors which may have determined the profitability of 
national banking activities in these markets. State-level fixed effects are included, as well as time 
fixed effects. The results are shown in tables 3 and 4 below. 
The regressions in table 3 highlight the importance of competition from state banks in 
driving down banking returns. National bank monopolies do have higher returns in the first 
specification, but this relationship disappears when more control variables are added. However, 
when a national bank has a full monopoly, meaning that it also faces no competition from state 
banks, then the estimated returns are significantly higher for that bank regardless of the 
specification. These results strongly suggest that the expansion of state banking over this period 
mitigated the impact of national bank monopolies on returns. In particular, the entry of state 
banks into markets which otherwise were monopolies for the local national bank resulted in 
significantly lower returns in these markets. Returns are also significantly lower in reserve cities, 
as might be expected from the competitive nature of these cities. In the final two specifications, a 
number of other variables that could potentially affect the profitability of national banking are 
included. Larger markets, as proxied by the city/town population, generally had lower returns, as 
did markets in urban areas. 
Table 4 uses the total number of banks to capture the competitiveness of the market, 
rather than a simple indicator variable. The results from using this measure are similar to those in 
table 3. State banks have a significant negative impact on the net returns to national banking in 
all specifications. In the first set of regressions, a higher number of national banks also drive 
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down banking returns, but this impact disappears when controlling for other aspects of the 
banking market. 
These results strongly suggest that the expansion of state banking played a key role in 
driving down banking returns in high-return areas and thus contributed to the convergence of 
returns over this period. These findings reinforce previous work by James (1976), who used a 
state-level analysis to show that state banking expansion was the key factor in making markets 
more competitive and equalizing returns across regions. He argued that this occurred primarily 
because of the free banking laws passed by numerous states during this period. In the next 
section, I quantify the impact of these laws on state banking expansion. 
2.5   State Banking Laws and the Growth of State Banking 
The free banking laws documented in Table 1 standardized entry requirements and eased 
the process of forming a state bank. However, these laws were not the only way for state banks 
to be chartered during this period. States without a general incorporation law for banks would 
instead grant charters through individual legislative acts; alternatively, banks might be able to 
obtain charters through general business incorporation laws (James 1978). The process of 
obtaining special charters was cumbersome and easily influenced by existing banks wanting to 
maintain their market power. General business incorporation laws were not geared toward banks 
specifically and were generally unclear about regulations and restrictions. Thus, the replacement 
of these methods with state banking laws which specified particular entry requirements and a 
minimum amount of capital could have facilitated the expansion of state banking. In Table 5, I 
quantify the role of free banking laws in increasing the number and capital of state banks. 
The main specification is as follows: 
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% 𝛥𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝑌𝑡 + 𝜂𝑆 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑖 indexes county merge units, 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖,𝑡−1 is an indicator variable which takes 
a value of 1 if the state has a free banking law at time t, 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 and 
𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 control for the (log) initial level of banking, total national output 𝑌𝑡 
controls for national economic fluctuations, and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 contains a number of county-level 
variables which could influence the rate of growth of state banking. Total population of the 
county controls for county size. Indicator variables for railroad and river access control for the 
influence of transportation.
4
 The literacy rate in the county, defined as the percentage of the 
population able to read, proxies for human capital. Because this variable is unavailable in the 
census for later years, the value for 1870 is for all observations. Finally, the percentage of the 
population living in urban areas (defined as towns with a population above 2,500) is included to 
control for urbanization. The regressions also include state fixed effects. 
One possible concern with this specification is whether or not the passage of a free 
banking law is in some other way correlated with the potential for state banking. It might have 
been the case that states with a larger potential for state banking would have been more likely to 
pass these laws. However, the data does not generally bear this out. For example, the prevalence 
of agriculture instead of manufacturing is a primary indicator of the competitive advantage of 
state banking. However, the indicator variable for the presence of a free banking law is not 
positively correlated with the percentage of county output which comes from farming; the two 
are in fact weakly negatively correlated (with a correlation coefficient of -.16). Furthermore, the 
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 Atack, Jaremski, and Rousseau (2014) demonstrate the importance of railroad access in furthering growth in 
banking. 
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likelihood of a particular state to pass such a law seems to depend on their past legislative history 
with regards to banking. For example, states which had free banking laws prior to the National 
Banking period either retained those laws or reinstituted them early in the period. By contrast, 
other states were prevented from doing so by the legislative environment (for example, Texas 
had a constitutional ban on all state banking until 1907). Tennessee established a state banking 
law with no minimum capital requirement early on, while neighboring (and economically 
similar) Kentucky never did. Although states had an incentive to issue as many bank charters as 
possible, the institutional restrictions facing them seem to have been the primary factor in 
determining whether or not a banking law was passed. 
Table 5 shows the results of the above specification, and it indicates that free banking 
laws did indeed enable state banking to expand at a much more rapid rate than it otherwise 
would have done. The presence of a free banking law is associated with a nearly 50% higher rate 
of growth of state banking. The effect on state bank capital is even greater, with a growth rate 
over 100% higher in the presence of a free banking law. Clearly, the passage of free banking 
laws facilitated the immense expansion of state banking throughout this period. Although free 
banking laws do not explain all of the increase in state banking, they account for a significant 
portion of the expansion. The results of tables 3 and 4 indicate that this expansion of state 
banking was instrumental in decreasing monopoly returns to national banking, as James (1976) 
first argued. However, this does not resolve the question of whether or not the passage of these 
free banking laws actually impacted economic growth. It could have been the case that state 
banks provided additional competition to national banks but, much like the banks chartered 
under free banking laws before the Civil War, did not contribute to growth themselves. In the 
next section, I explore the link between state banking expansion and economic growth. 
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2.6   State Banking Expansion and Economic Growth 
The main complication in an empirical study of the impact of banking on growth is the 
potential for growth to impact banking as well. Any empirical analysis must confront the 
possibility that banks chose to open in places that were already experiencing higher economic 
growth. This would lead a simple analysis to overstate the impact of banking on growth. In order 
to confront the issue of simultaneity, I take the approach used in King and Levine (1993) and 
Bodenhorn (2000) of using initial banking variables, rather than contemporaneous measures, to 
measure the impact on growth. Although this is far from a perfect method, it at least partially 
addresses the issue of simultaneity by using predetermined financial variables. I am also able to 
control for a number of independent factors which impact the growth prospects of the county, 
further reducing simultaneity bias. In the regressions below, I quantify the impact of state 
banking on output growth and the growth of physical capital. Following that, I use those results 
along with the results in table 5 to estimate the aggregate impact of regulatory competition via 
free banking laws on economic growth in this period. I find that free banking laws had a positive 
and significant impact on agricultural capital and output over this period. 
In order to first examine the impact of initial banking variables on subsequent economic 
growth, I estimate the following pooled OLS regression: 
% 𝛥𝑌𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑌𝑡 + 𝜂𝑆 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑖 indexes county merge units. 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
and 𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 capture either the initial number of banks or the initial 
amount of banking capital in each county merge unit. 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 is the initial value of either farming, 
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manufacturing, or total output in the county, and 𝑌𝑡 is the aggregate level of output for each 
respective variable. This latter variable captures aggregate fluctuations in either farming, 
manufacturing, or total output in order to account for national macroeconomic trends in output. 
𝜂𝑆 is a set of state fixed effects. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 contains the same county-level controls as before. Once 
again, total population controls for the overall size of the county, rail and river access control for 
transportation opportunities, the literacy rate proxies for human capital, and the urbanization rate 
controls for the urban composition of the county. The inclusion of these variables should at least 
partially account for the underlying growth prospects of the county. Standard errors are clustered 
at the county level. 
Table 6 indicates that state banks had a significant impact on agricultural output. 
Doubling the number of banks increases the rate of growth of agricultural output by nearly 2% 
over the following decade. National banks are also positively related to agricultural growth, but 
the coefficient is not significant. National banks are clearly more important than state banks for 
manufacturing growth; while national banks are strongly related to manufacturing growth, state 
banks show no relationship whatsoever. The importance of state banks for agriculture but not for 
manufacturing makes sense given that one of the primary advantages of state banks was that they 
were allowed to issue loans using real estate as collateral. As land was relatively more important 
in agriculture than in manufacturing, this made state banks particularly suited to agricultural 
lending. The ultimate result of this is that both state and national banks have significant impacts 
on total output, but the impact of national banks is significantly higher. 
The set of county-level control variables generally behave as expected. Larger counties 
grew more quickly, as did counties with rail access. River access and literacy both seem to 
matter for manufacturing growth but not farm growth, while more urban counties saw more 
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manufacturing growth but less farm growth. County-level output of all types is higher when 
national output is higher. 
Table 7 uses total banking capital as an alternate measure of the quantity of banking 
services offered in each county, rather than simply the number of banks. This measure has the 
advantage of reflecting not only the raw number of banks, but also the average size of each bank 
as well. All other variables are the same as before. 
Once again, state bank capital is important for agricultural growth, while national bank 
capital is primarily important for manufacturing growth. The coefficients are generally about half 
as large as those in table 6. This suggests that there might be a separate growth impact to having 
additional banks, perhaps due to increased competition, which does not come from simply 
increasing the total amount of banking capital in the area. 
Table 8 quantifies the impact of state and national banks on physical capital rather than 
output. During this period, banks did not generally issue loans in order to fund long-term capital 
projects. Instead, banks generally adhered to the real bills doctrine, according to which loans 
should only be issued for short periods of time (a maximum of 6 months), and they should be 
self-liquidating (meaning that they are issued for a specific economic activity which provides the 
money to repay the loan upon completion). Under these banking practices, the state and national 
banks studied here likely only issued loans to fund short-term working capital. Thus, it is not 
obvious that banking would have a direct impact on capital. However, the short-term loans 
issued by banks may very well have increased the potential marginal productivity of capital in 
their local areas, leading to an increase in capital without directly funding it. I investigate this 
possibility using the following specification: 
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% 𝛥𝐾𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑌𝑡 + 𝜂𝑆 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
The three separate regressions separately investigate the impact of banking on 
agricultural capital, manufacturing capital, and total capital. Manufacturing capital comes 
directly from the census data in Haines (2004), while farming capital is the sum of the value of 
farmland, farm buildings, farm equipment, and livestock (buildings are not reported separately 
from farmland until the 1900 census). County-level and aggregate control variables are as before. 
Standard errors are clustered at the county level. The results in table 8 are similar to the previous 
two tables. However, in this case we can definitively say that national banks are important for the 
growth of agricultural capital as well as manufacturing capital. 
The set of results in tables 6-8 establish the positive impact of state banking on economic 
output, in particular agricultural output. I can use these results to estimate a counterfactual in 
which there were no free banking laws passed at the state level at this time. This will yield a 
rough approximation of the positive impact that regulatory competition, in the form of the 
passage of free banking laws, had on real economic growth. This counterfactual does not capture 
the full effect of regulatory competition, because even states which did not pass free banking 
laws began to charter more banks in order to gain market share. However, it will give some idea 
of the aggregate impact of the laws themselves. 
The first step is estimating the number of state banks which still would have existed, even 
without free banking laws. I calculate this for each county with the results in table 5, using the 
coefficient in column 1. In actuality, there were a little over 5,000 state banks in 1900. In a 
counterfactual where the state banking law indicator always takes a value of 0, the regression 
predicts about 3,600 total state banks in 1900. With the counterfactual number of state banks in 
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each county, I use the results in tables 6 and 8 to predict a counterfactual amount of agricultural 
output and capital for each county. The resulting prediction is that, in the absence of any free 
banking laws, both total agricultural output and total agricultural capital would have been about 
1% lower in 1900. While not a huge figure by any means, this nevertheless demonstrates that 
regulatory competition in the form of state free banking laws had significant and measurable 
positive impacts on the economy by facilitating the growth of state banking. 
2.7   Conclusion 
The evidence indicates that the free banking laws passed during this period had a 
significant positive impact on output. The high minimum capital requirements established under 
the National Banking Acts restricted the expansion of national banks into smaller markets, but 
also created a profit opportunity for states to increase the issuance of their own charters. 
Furthermore, more than just expanding banking services into smaller markets, these new states 
banks increased output growth, in particular in the agricultural sector. The dual banking system 
has long been credited with furthering the establishment of efficient legal rules and regulations in 
the 20th century (Scott 1977). Here I have demonstrated that from its inception, it has had 
positive impacts on banking and economic growth. 
This study is limited to examining regulatory competition as embodied in state banking 
laws passed from 1870-1900. However, this was only the first form of regulatory competition 
under the dual system. In order to compete with the expanding state banks, in 1900 the federal 
government passed the Gold Standard Act to decrease the minimum capital requirements of 
national banks from $50,000 to $25,000 in small towns. As Sylla (1969) shows, the number of 
national banks nearly doubled in the decade following this new law, and nearly two-thirds of 
these new banks had a capital stock that was less than the previous $50,000 threshold. In 
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response, nearly every state which had a minimum capital requirement above the new $25,000 
limit reduced them in order to remain competitive (White 1982). With the establishment of the 
Federal Reserve in 1913 reserve requirements were relaxed further, along with and restrictions 
on real estate lending, in order to entice banks to join the new system. By 1915, fifteen states had 
reduced their own reserve requirements in response. 
In short, the pattern of competition between state and federal banking regulators extends 
significantly beyond the present study. Certainly, this progressive relaxation of restrictions likely 
had negative effects on the stability of the banking system, demonstrated in the banking troubles 
of the Great Depression. Yet it should not be forgotten that facilitating the expansion of the 
financial system has positive results for the provision of banking services and for economic 
growth itself. 
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury. Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency (1931), pp. 3, 5.
Figure 1. U.S. banking growth from 1870-1900
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Source: Davis (1965), Appendix Table 4
Figure 2. Convergence of national banking returns, by region
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Table 1: State Banking Laws and Minimum Capital Requirements
State Year Capital Requirement
Alabama 1886 50,000 (25,000 paid in)
Colorado 1876 30,000
Florida 1889 15,000
Georgia 1893 25,000
Iowa 1873 25,000
Illinois 1887 25,000
Indiana 1873 25,000
Kansas 1891 5,000
Louisiana 1892 10,000
Michigan 1871 15,000
Minnesota 1878 10,000
Missouri 1879 10,000
Montana 1889 20,000
North Dakota 1889 5,000
Nebraska 1870 5,000
New Mexico 1888 30,000
New York 1870 25,000
Ohio 1870 25,000
Oklahoma 1897 5,000
South Dakota 1891 5,000
Tennessee 1870 0
Utah 1895 25,000
Washington 1889 25,000
Wisconsin 1870 25,000
West Virginia 1872 25,000
Wyoming 1889 10,000
Sources: Barnett (1911), Knox (1903), Rand McNally
International Bankers’ Directory, various years.
Entered as 1870 if in effect prior to the current analysis.
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Table 2: Fraction of Banking Markets in Monopoly
Year National Bank Monopoly Full Monopoly
1870 .65 .61
1880 .52 .43
1890 .36 .20
1900 .29 .15
Table 3: National Bank Earnings and Monopoly in National Bank Cities
National Bank Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
National bank monopoly 0.0350∗∗ -0.0176
(2.36) (-1.01)
Full monopoly 0.0993∗∗∗ 0.0622∗∗∗
(6.63) (3.59)
Reserve city indicator -0.825∗∗∗ -0.808∗∗∗ -0.673∗∗∗ -0.705∗∗∗
(-11.56) (-11.43) (-8.94) (-9.35)
ln(City population) -0.0414∗∗∗ -0.0224∗∗
(-4.36) (-2.41)
Percent of county -0.0933∗ -0.0789
output from farming (-1.72) (-1.45)
Percent urban -0.116∗∗ -0.120∗∗
in county (-2.00) (-2.07)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,409 6,409 6,028 6,028
R-squared 0.815 0.816 0.819 0.819
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 4: National Bank Earnings and the Number of Banks in National Bank Cities
National Bank Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(State banks) -0.0247∗∗∗ -0.0231∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗
(-7.50) (-6.85) (-4.50) (-4.49)
ln(National banks) -0.0519∗∗∗ -0.0297∗∗ 0.00603 -0.000387
(-3.66) (-2.05) (0.33) (-0.02)
Reserve city indicator -0.741∗∗∗ -0.758∗∗∗ -0.697∗∗∗ -0.667∗∗∗ -0.681∗∗∗ -0.667∗∗∗
(-10.32) (-10.15) (-9.30) (-8.89) (-8.99) (-8.82)
ln(City population) -0.0223∗∗ -0.0388∗∗∗ -0.0221∗∗
(-2.48) (-3.78) (-2.03)
Percent of county -0.0715 -0.0936∗ -0.0715
output from farming (-1.31) (-1.72) (-1.31)
Percent urban -0.0999∗ -0.118∗∗ -0.1000∗
in county (-1.72) (-2.04) (-1.72)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,409 6,409 6,409 6,028 6,028 6,028
R-squared 0.816 0.815 0.816 0.819 0.819 0.819
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 5: State Banking Laws and the Growth of State Banking
Dependent Variable: Percent Change in State Banking Variable
(1) (2)
Number of State Banks State Bank Capital
State banking law 0.492∗∗∗ 1.235∗∗∗
indicator (4.58) (5.34)
ln(State banks) -0.577∗∗∗
(-41.63)
ln(National banks) 0.0252∗
(1.73)
ln(State bank capital) -0.589∗∗∗
(-43.00)
ln(National bank capital) 0.0192
(1.42)
ln(Population) 0.592∗∗∗ 1.198∗∗∗
(16.18) (15.32)
Rail access 0.512∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗
(6.31) (6.08)
River access 0.0696 0.137
(1.12) (1.02)
Literacy rate 1.062∗∗∗ 1.970∗∗∗
(3.35) (2.88)
Percent urban 0.392∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗
(3.49) (3.96)
ln(Aggregate output) 1.409∗∗∗ 2.704∗∗∗
(11.03) (10.02)
State fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 5,916 5,916
R-squared 0.279 0.280
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 6: Pooled OLS: The Impact of Initial Banks on Output Growth, 1870-1900
Dependent Variable: Percentage Change in Output
(1) (2) (3)
Agricultural Manufacturing Total
ln(State banks) 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.00005 0.0217∗∗∗
(4.66) (0.00) (3.91)
ln(National banks) 0.0107 0.0563∗∗∗ 0.0327∗∗∗
(1.43) (3.21) (3.48)
ln(Initial level of) -0.665∗∗∗ -0.823∗∗∗ -0.799∗∗∗
dependent variable) (-14.26) (-36.58) (-15.86)
ln(Population) 0.440∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗
(7.44) (13.08) (10.78)
Rail access 0.195∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(6.89) (7.44) (6.45)
River access -0.0171 0.205∗∗∗ 0.0681∗∗∗
(-0.76) (4.21) (3.06)
Literacy rate 0.107 2.415∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗
(0.64) (5.39) (2.52)
Percent urban -0.429∗∗ 0.957∗ 0.423
(-1.98) (1.84) (1.54)
ln(Aggregate output) 1.741∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(12.45) (7.32) (7.80)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,916 5,916 5,916
R-squared 0.580 0.511 0.534
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 7: Pooled OLS: The Impact of Initial Bank Capital on Output Growth, 1870-1900
Dependent Variable: Percentage Change in Output
(1) (2) (3)
Agricultural Manufacturing Total
ln(State bank capital) 0.00737∗∗∗ 0.00194 0.00992∗∗∗
(4.08) (0.39) (3.96)
ln(National bank capital) 0.00383 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗
(1.19) (3.17) (3.21)
ln(Initial level of -0.666∗∗∗ -0.823∗∗∗ -0.798∗∗∗
dependent variable) (-14.30) (-36.58) (-15.78)
ln(Population) 0.446∗∗∗ 0.846∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗
(7.57) (13.11) (10.79)
Rail access 0.196∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗
(6.91) (7.37) (6.31)
River access -0.0165 0.204∗∗∗ 0.0689∗∗∗
(-0.74) (4.20) (3.09)
Literacy rate 0.114 2.412∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗
(0.68) (5.39) (2.55)
Percent urban -0.423∗∗ 0.952∗ 0.428
(-1.99) (1.84) (1.54)
ln(Aggregate output) 1.768∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(12.75) (7.78) (8.79)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,916 5,916 5,916
R-squared 0.579 0.511 0.533
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 8: Pooled OLS: The Impact of Initial Banks on Capital Growth, 1870-1900
Dependent Variable: Percentage Change in Physical Capital
(1) (2) (3)
Agricultural Manufacturing Total
ln(State banks) 0.0165∗∗∗ -0.00241 0.0267∗∗∗
(4.10) (-0.21) (6.65)
ln(National banks) 0.0233∗∗∗ 0.0567∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗
(3.27) (3.24) (5.21)
ln(Initial level of -0.648∗∗∗ -0.787∗∗∗ -0.801∗∗∗
dependent variable) (-14.00) (-34.56) (-16.67)
ln(Population) 0.369∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗
(6.40) (12.13) (9.97)
Rail access 0.152∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(4.61) (7.62) (5.90)
River access -0.0151 0.198∗∗∗ -0.00771
(-0.66) (4.07) (-0.39)
Literacy rate 0.717∗∗∗ 2.107∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗
(3.39) (4.97) (4.77)
Percent urban -0.307∗∗ 0.925∗ -0.0306
(-1.98) (1.77) (-0.49)
ln(Aggregate -0.0807 0.691∗∗∗ 0.0991∗∗∗
output) (-0.66) (10.22) (3.29)
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,916 5,916 5,916
R-squared 0.623 0.480 0.628
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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CHAPTER III 
SILVER COINAGE AND NATIONAL BANK EXPANSION IN THE LATE 1800S 
3.1    Introduction 
Following the Civil War, the number of nationally chartered banks grew dramatically, 
increasing from 1,600 in 1866 to over 3,700 in 1900. This growth in national banking facilitated 
the expansion of manufacturing and spurred overall economic growth.
1
 However, banking 
growth was limited by high capital and reserve requirements. The National Banking Act required 
national banks to have at minimum $50,000 in capital, and bank deposits had to be backed by 
legal tender reserves in amounts varying from 15% to 25%. Many studies of the national banking 
system have concluded that these capital and reserve requirements were binding and restricted 
the growth of national banking (e.g. Sylla 1969). The availability of gold specie to serve as high-
powered money was an important but unappreciated factor in determining how restrictive these 
requirements truly were. For most of this time period, the stock of gold grew at a rapid pace, 
facilitating an increase in bank deposits and the number of banks. Yet in the mid-1880s, the 
growth rate of the gold stock fell to virtually zero, and stayed there for a decade. Instead, the 
growth of the high-powered money stock consisted primarily of the coinage of silver, which 
began with the Bland Allison Act in 1878 and lasted until 1893. In this paper, we demonstrate 
that the coinage of silver, and particularly its usage as lawful money after 1882 (money allowed 
to be used for bank deposits) facilitated the growth of national banking in the absence of an 
increasing gold stock. We show that the coinage of silver as lawful money was positively 
associated with the formation of new national banks, and that this effect was particularly strong 
for counties in close economic proximity to the mints in Philadelphia and New Orleans. 
                                                        
1
 See for example Jaremski (2014), Fulford (2015). 
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The most common view of silver coinage legislation among economic historians is not 
generally positive. Cagan (1963) points out that silver coinage legislation was the product of a 
political coalition between silver producers and agrarian farmers, the former wishing to increase 
the price of silver and the latter attempting to increase the money stock to cause inflation and 
diminish their debts in real terms. Rather than being sound economic policy, it was born of 
economic populism and industry lobbying. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue that silver 
coinage threatened the maintenance of the gold standard primarily by demonstrating the political 
power of the silver forces and decreasing the willingness of foreigners to hold dollars (over fears 
that free silver coinage might eventually return). In particular, the Sherman Silver Act of 1890 
greatly accelerated the rate of silver coinage and was viewed by its proponents as a temporary 
stepping stone to the free coinage of silver. Calomiris (1992) maintains, however, that silver 
coinage did not seriously threaten the long-term maintenance of the gold standard. Rather, the 
source of financial instability in 1893 was concerns about the short-term convertibility of gold 
due to the depleted nature of the Treasury's gold stock. Regardless, economic literature pointing 
to any positive effects of silver coinage is scarce. The results of this paper point to such a 
positive outcome: it allowed the stock of high powered money to continue to expand and 
therefore facilitated the growth of the banking system. 
We use data on the number and location of national banks from 1870 to 1900 in order to 
analyze the effect of silver coinage on the national banking system. We focus on national banks 
because the capital and reserve requirements were much higher for them than for most state 
banks, so we would expect them to be the most constrained by a lack of high-powered money. 
We first show that the aggregate impact of silver coinage on bank formation was positive over 
this period, and then we utilize county-level variation in economic proximity to the mints at 
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which silver was produced to further identify the impact of silver. Section 3.2 describes the 
historical context and particulars of silver coinage and the national banking system. Section 3.3 
describes the data used. Section 3.4 tests the aggregate impact of silver coinage. Sections 3.5 and 
3.6 use economic proximity to mints to identify the impact of silver coinage, first for each mint 
separately and then for the full set of counties. Section 3.7 concludes. 
3.2   Historical Background of Silver Coinage 
Although silver coinage was technically legal when the national banking system was 
founded, the market price of silver consistently exceeded its mint value. Because of this, coinage 
of silver was unprofitable and did not occur. In 1873, Congress officially discontinued the 
coinage of silver, in an act which would come to be called the “Crime of '73.” Although the act 
was uncontroversial in 1873, shortly after it was passed major silver discoveries in the western 
U.S. led to a substantial fall in the market price of silver to below the old coinage value. Silver 
producers lobbied Congress to reinstate coinage in order to increase the value of silver. They 
were joined by large numbers of rural farmers, who were generally heavily in debt and were 
suffering greatly under the prevailing deflationary trend at the time. They clamored for silver 
coinage in order to increase the money supply and result in inflation, attempting to reduce their 
debt burden. The result was the Bland-Allison Act of 1878, which resulted in the U.S. Treasury 
purchasing 2 million dollars’ worth of silver per month for the purposes of coinage. 
Under this act, newly mined silver could be brought to any U.S. mint, and it would be 
bought and coined by the Treasury (up to the 2 million dollar monthly limit). Silver purchases at 
the mint under this act were generally made with silver money or silver certificates, which then 
made their way into circulation and the banking system relatively quickly (Taussig 1893). 
However, initially bankers were very hesitant to hold silver as high-powered money, instead 
 63 
paying it immediately back to the Treasury in taxes. The primary reason for this was silver's 
uncertain status as lawful money. Silver was not clearly designated as lawful money until the Act 
of July 12, 1882 (Champ and Thompson 2006). From this point on, the amount of high powered 
money in the form of silver grew steadily. In 1890 Bland-Allison was replaced the Sherman 
Purchase Act, which increased the purchase of silver to 4.5 million dollars per month and 
introduced Treasury notes backed by silver. 
This change in silver policy coincided with a stagnation in the growth rate of the gold 
stock. From gold resumption in 1879 up through the foundation of the Federal Reserve in 1913, 
the amount of high-powered money in the form of gold grew rapidly, at an average annual rate of 
12.3%. However, in the mid-1880s, the growth in the gold stock fell to virtually zero, and 
remained there for nearly a decade. The amount of gold available as high-powered money in 
1885 amounted to $421 million; ten years later, the stock was virtually unchanged at $439 
million. During this same period, the amount of silver available as high powered money grew 
dramatically. Coinage began with the Bland-Allison Act of 1878. Following this law and the 
Sherman Purchase Act of 1890 (which increased the rate of silver purchases significantly), by 
1892 the amount of high-powered money in the form of silver had reached $482 million, nearly 
equal to the amount of high powered gold money. The growth of gold and silver in the stock of 
high-powered money over this period is shown in Figure 1 below. 
This growth in silver and relative to gold led to fears that the U.S. would abandon the 
gold standard. The U.S. saw extremely high gold outflows during this period, both from the 
Treasury and from the country as a whole. By 1893, gold reserves had fallen below $100 million, 
calling into question the ability of the Treasury to redeem legal tender notes with gold. The Panic 
of 1893 soon followed, and the Sherman Purchase Act was repealed that year. In 1900 the Gold 
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Standard Act reinforced the government's commitment to gold, officially bringing an end to the 
era of silver coinage. At the same time, major new gold discoveries (along with the discovery of 
the cyanide process for gold extraction) led to an expansion of the gold stock which would 
continue into the new century, ending the need for silver coinage permanently. However, over 
the period from 1882 to 1893, silver coinage was the source of the expansion of high-powered 
money needed to expand banking and bank deposits. 
3.3   Data 
The data used in this project come from a variety of sources. Data on the number and 
location of national banks was taken from various years of the Merchants and Bankers' 
Directory. This data begins in 1870 and continues yearly to 1900. This data includes, at the 
county level, the number of national banks in operation each year and the number of new banks 
chartered in a year. The data on silver and gold coinage comes from the Reports of the Director 
of the Mint, 1870 to 1900. We approximate silver coinage with the amount of silver deposited at 
the mint in a given year. These silver deposits were generally paid for with newly-created silver 
coins or certificates, meaning that silver intake led immediately to more silver-based money in 
circulation (Taussig 1893). Thus, these figures constitute an accurate estimate of the amount of 
new silver money put into circulation by each mint. We subtract redeposits (previously coined 
silver being recoined) from this figure to capture only the new silver entering circulation. 
This paper focuses on the mints of Philadelphia, New Orleans, and San Francisco (we 
exclude the Carson City mint due to its small output and limited years of operation). The New 
Orleans mint is a particularly interesting case for this project, as it was opened in 1878 (the same 
year that Bland-Allison was passed) and was in existence almost exclusively to coin silver (the 
amount of gold it produced was insignificant). However, the majority of the silver coinage came 
 65 
from the Philadelphia mint, particularly during the short time of the silver purchase act. Silver 
deposits at all three mints are shown in figure 2 below. 
Most obvious is the immense amount of coinage in Philadelphia after the passage of the Sherman 
Purchase Act. Although the other two mints' productions were comparable to Philadelphia's 
through most of the period, they did not respond to the Sherman Purchase Act in the same way. 
Additionally, the San Francisco mint was unique in that its gold production was consistently 
higher than its silver production in every year. Thus, although the San Francisco mint did 
participate in silver coinage, silver was a secondary output for that mint. Due to the prevalence of 
gold on the west coast, most hand-to-hand transactions in that region were conducted with gold 
and gold certificates rather than national bank notes. Thus, gold played a uniquely important role 
in the economy around the San Francisco mint, and we show that the impact of silver in this 
region is not as clear as in other areas. 
County-level data on population, urbanization rates, and physical capital comes from 
Haines (2004). One problem with using this data is that county borders shifted significantly over 
the period from 1870 to 1900. In order to ensure a consistent set of observations, we merge 
counties were more than 15 square miles moved from one county to another (using the NHGIS 
shapefiles for this period). Because the data from Haines is only available every 10 years, we use 
linear interpolation to obtain values for intervening years. Yearly data on industrial production 
comes from the Industrial Production Index in Davis (2004). This is used to control for aggregate 
fluctuations that may impact the rate of formation of national banks. 
One important aspect of our identification strategy is to use transportation costs as a 
measure of economic proximity to the different mints, in order to differentiate the effects of 
silver coinage across counties. Data on the transportation network (including the railroad 
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network, rivers, and canals) comes from Atack (2015). This data allows us to capture the 
expansion of the railroad network occurring over this period to calculate time-varying 
transportation costs from all counties to the various mints. Figure 3 shows the transportation 
network as it existed in 1900, along with the location of the three mints. It also shows the results 
of the county merges conducted. 
This transportation network data allows us to test for a differential impact of silver across 
counties. If silver output was important to the formation of national banks, it might be the case 
that this effect was strongest near the mints. We employ this strategy in section 3.6. The next 
section contains baseline regressions of the importance of aggregate silver coinage for banking. 
3.4   Aggregate Silver Coinage and Banking Growth 
The first test of our hypothesis that silver had a positive impact on national bank 
expansion is a simple set of panel data regressions linking national silver output to banking 
growth variables at the county level. The main specification is shown below: 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
The variable of interest, 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡, captures the aggregate level of silver 
deposited at all mints during the current year and the previous two (excluding redeposits, as 
described in Section 3.3). Thus, it is a cumulative measure of silver intake over the previous 3 
years. This formulation allows some flexibility in how long it might take for silver deposited at 
the mint to make an impact on the banking system (in robustness checks, we try several different 
plausible measures for silver, varying the timing of the expected impact). In the first regression, 
this simply includes all silver coined, but in the second column we only look at silver coinage 
which was actually legal tender. Given the uncertain status of silver money in the banking 
system prior to 1882, we might expect that the positive impact of silver only appears when silver 
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is actually designated as lawful money. Isolating the silver coinage during this period allows us 
to test this. 
A number of other county level factors (𝑋𝑖,𝑡) are included to control for possible demand-
side effects. The initial number of national banks is included to control for a possible 
convergence effect. Several census data variables are also included. The county population, the 
percentage of the population living in urban areas, farm capital per capita, and manufacturing 
capital per capita all control for various aspects of the demand for banking services in the county. 
𝑌𝑡 contains the aggregate industrial production index from Davis (2004).
2
 This variable is 
included to control for aggregate fluctuations which might have impacted the rate of bank 
formation independently of aggregate silver production. County fixed effects are also included 
(𝑢𝑖). All variables (except for the urbanization rate) are in log form in all regressions. 
Column 1 indicates that aggregate silver coinage on its own does not have a significant 
impact on the formation of national banks. However, when only the coinage of silver which was 
actually lawful money is included, the impact of silver on banking is larger and statistically 
significant. This result is consistent with the idea that silver coinage, during the period when 
silver was officially lawful money and could be used as reserves for bank deposits, had a positive 
impact on bank formation. The effects of control variables are generally intuitive. The initial 
value of national banks shows a convergence effect, industrial production is (weakly) positively 
associated with bank formation, and larger counties see more bank formation. The impact of the 
other variables is not statistically significant in this specification, however. Because the banking 
formation data is yearly and therefore highly variable, we see very low values of 𝑅2 in both 
regressions. 
                                                        
2
 Although we cannot include time fixed effects along with an aggregate silver production measure, in section 3.6 
we use an interaction with economic proximity to mints to eliminate all aggregate time trend variables, enabling us 
to include time fixed effects in that specification. 
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Broadly speaking, these results provide a prima facie reason for thinking that silver 
coinage (as lawful money) might have had a positive impact on banking. However, the varying 
behavior of the different mints gives us an additional tool with which to identify the impact of 
silver. For example, we would expect that the mint activity in New Orleans would be most 
important for counties near to that particular mint. In the next section, we examine each mint 
individually. We use the transportation network at the time to calculate a measure of economic 
proximity between all counties and each mint, which allows us to study the impact of each mint 
on local counties. 
3.5   Economic Proximity to the Mints 
In this section, we examine the local impact of silver coinage at each mint on national 
banking growth. In order to do so, we approximate the transportation cost between all counties 
(using the county centroid) and each of the three mints. This approximation uses the full 
transportation network shown in figure 3, including all railroads, rivers, and canals in existence.
3
 
For each mint, we set a maximum transportation cost of $10 per ton in 1870 in order to define 
the counties considered “close” to the mint (in order to consistently include the same set of 
counties, we do not allow this set of counties to change as transportation networks improve. The 
economic proximity measure used in the next section takes the expanding transportation network 
into account). This figure of $10 is chosen because it generally includes enough observations for 
a robust result while excluding a large portion of the country which is far removed from the mint 
(although, as we will see, the small number of distinct counties on the west coast limits the 
sample size around the San Francisco mint severely). Having restricted the sample around each 
                                                        
3
 Transportation costs per ton-mile are set to the values used in Fogel (1962) and Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016). 
Railroad transportation costs 0.63 cents per ton-mile, water transportation costs 0.49 cents per ton-mile, and wagon 
transportation (in the absence of any other transportation option) costs 23.1 cents per ton-mile. 
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mint, tables 2-4 shows a set of regressions which look separately at the silver coinage of each 
mint. In table 2, the specification is similar to that of the previous section, but 𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
now contains only the output of the Philadelphia mint. The sample contains only those counties 
within a transportation cost of $10 per ton to Philadelphia. The results are shown below.  
As before, the coefficient on silver coinage is only positive and significant when only 
lawful money silver is included. The control variables generally behave as before. Farm capital is 
negatively related to national bank formation, likely reflecting the fact that state banks had a 
competitive advantage over national banks in lending to farmers (they were allowed to engage in 
mortgage lending, while national banks were not). 
Table 3 shows similar results for the New Orleans mint. The sample size is again limited 
to counties within a transport cost of $10 per ton to the mint. The results are similar to those for 
Philadelphia. As previously mentioned, the New Orleans mint was founded the year after 
coinage began under Bland-Allison as the major mint to serve the interior of the country, and it 
exclusively produced silver over this period. Thus, it was in the best position to meet the demand 
for high-powered money in the interior portion of the country. Table 3 indicates that its activities 
of silver coinage did just this, allowing for the expansion of national banks over the period. 
Table 4 shows the same specification for counties around San Francisco. The San 
Francisco mint was unique during this period for several reasons. Most importantly, it was the 
only mint producing a large amount of gold over this time. In fact, it produced significantly more 
gold than silver during every year of this period. Furthermore, because of the prevalence of gold 
in the west, it was often the case that gold and gold certificates would be used as currency 
instead of national bank notes. This practice set it apart from the rest of the country in terms of 
its likelihood to respond to silver coinage. Additionally, because of the lack of distinct county 
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units on the west coast, the sample size in the area around the mint is extremely small. For these 
reasons, the results in table 4 below are significantly different from the previous results. 
Lawful silver no longer matters, and overall silver appears to have a negative impact on 
banking formation, rather than a positive impact. However, as mentioned, the sample size is 
incredibly small compared to the previous regressions, and a number of the control variables no 
longer matter or take the opposite sign of what would be expected (such as the urbanization rate 
and manufacturing capital per capita). Although it is hard to say anything about the counties near 
the San Francisco mint, the usage of gold as currency instead of national bank notes, along with 
the results in table 4 cast doubt on the relevance of our silver hypothesis for the west coast. Thus, 
in the regressions that follow, we exclude the (few) counties which are closer to San Francisco 
than any other mint. 
3.6   Utilizing Economic Proximity 
In the previous section, we showed that the particular coinage activities of the 
Philadelphia and New Orleans mints positively impacted counties close to those mints (in terms 
of economic proximity). We can also use economic proximity to mints more directly by 
including it in the regression to investigate whether or not silver coinage was more important for 
counties that were closer to the various mints. To estimate the economic proximity of county i to 
mint j in year t , we use the transportation cost between the two (𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡) to 
calculate economic proximity as 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 =
1
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
. The network of railroads 
expanded significantly over the period from 1870 to 1900, and we are able to capture this 
expansion with railroad data from Atack (2015) in order to allow proximity to vary with time. 
Using this measure, we estimate the following specification: 
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𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑌𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 captures the economic proximity of county i to the nearest mint, and 
𝑆𝑖𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 captures the output of that mint. This specification captures our intuition that the effect 
of silver coinage should be largest in counties that are most proximate to the mint. 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 contains 
the same set of county controls as before, and 𝑌𝑡 is again the industrial production index which 
controls for aggregate economic conditions. 𝑢𝑖 is the county fixed effect. The results of this 
specification are shown in table 5. 
The impact of silver does indeed appear to be largest for counties close to either the 
Philadelphia or the New Orleans mint. Although the effect of silver coinage is significant for all 
counties regardless of location, counties nearest the mints see the biggest gains. These results 
provide perhaps the strongest evidence that silver coinage, when it was designated as official 
lawful money, aided the growth of the national banking system. 
In all of the previous results, we have approximated the silver coinage of each mint with 
a cumulative measure of silver intake over a three year period. This assumption allows several 
years for silver to be coined and for its impact to be felt. However, we do not have reliable data 
on how quickly this silver was coined or made it into circulation. We test the importance of this 
assumption in a series of robustness checks in table 6, which uses two alternate assumptions 
about the timing of silver coinage and impact. In the first two columns, we use contemporaneous 
silver intake in each year as our approximation of silver output, and in the final two we instead 
lag silver intake by one year. The results are similar regardless of the assumptions made about 
the timing of the impact of silver coinage. National banking growth is higher when more lawful 
money silver is coined, and the effect is stronger closer to the mints in which it is being coined. 
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As a final check, if we drop the aggregate silver measure altogether and only include 
silver weighted by transport costs, we can include time fixed effects in the model. Although we 
have the industrial production index from Davis (2004) as a control for aggregate fluctuations in 
previous regressions, time fixed effects are an alternate way to control for aggregate effects. 
Table 7 shows the results without any aggregate time trends and with time fixed effects included. 
All three measures of the timing of the silver impact are shown.  
Although the coefficients on silver coinage in this specification are about half as large as 
before, silver is still positively and significantly related to national banking growth. We conclude 
from this that our previous results are not driven simply by the choice of control for aggregate 
effects. Rather, silver coinage mattered, and it mattered most around the mints. 
3.7   Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated the importance of silver coinage during the 1880s and early 
1890s in supporting banking growth. More silver coinage is associated with a higher rate of 
national bank formation, and this effect is particularly important for counties close to the mints. 
The reason that silver coinage was particularly important at the time was the temporary halt in 
the expansion of the gold stock and the need for some form of high-powered money to serve as 
bank deposits. Taussig, a contemporary observer of the silver coinage period, argued that the 
issuance of silver under Bland-Allison appeared to be just the right amount to serve the 
increasing needs for currency by the public. He noted in 1893 that “It appears, then, that the issue 
under the act of 1878 was not on the whole excessive. By a lucky accident, it corresponded with 
sufficient closeness to what the community was in a position to use for its growing transactions.” 
Although the legislation was driven by populism and industry lobbying rather than sound 
economic policy, it nevertheless met the currency needs at the time. 
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However, the increased rate of silver coinage under the Sherman Purchase Act 
undoubtedly stoked fears about the ability of the US to maintain gold convertibility. Calomiris 
(1992) argued that the true risk from the silver legislation was to threaten short-term 
convertibility into gold, and that this led to the run on the dollar in 1893 and contributed to the 
Panic which followed. Undoubtedly, the silver legislation ultimately had negative effects on the 
stability of the financial system near the turn of the century. Nevertheless, it did provide an 
additional source of high-powered money at a time when banking expansion might have been 
slowed without it. 
   
 
Source: Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
Figure 1. Composition of high-powered money following Resumption
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Source: Reports of the Director of the Mint , various years.
Figure 2. Silver deposits by mint, 1878-1893
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Railroad lines are shown in red, rivers and canals in blue. The location of the mints is shown by the green dots.
Source: Atack (2015)
Figure 3. Transportation Network
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Table 1: The Impact of Silver Coinage on National Bank Formation
(1) (2)
New National Banks New National Banks
All silver 0.0013
(1.27)
Lawful money silver 0.0018∗∗∗
(14.40)
Initial national banks -0.095∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(-19.55) (-20.32)
Industrial production index 0.0097 0.011∗
(1.48) (1.68)
Population 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(12.88) (13.11)
Percent urban -0.016 -0.043
(-0.56) (-1.48)
Farm capital -0.0052 0.0048
(-0.76) (0.71)
Manufacturing capital -0.0015 0.00023
(-0.48) (0.07)
County fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 33,360 33,360
R2 0.015 0.021
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2: The Impact of Philadelphia Silver Coinage on National Bank Formation
(1) (2)
New National Banks New National Banks
All silver (Philadelphia only) -0.0018
(-1.49)
Lawful silver (Philadelphia only) 0.0011∗∗∗
(7.00)
Initial national banks -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗
(-18.50) (-18.78)
Industrial production index 0.031∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(3.74) (3.37)
Population 0.093∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(6.27) (6.01)
Percent urban -0.049 -0.058
(-1.36) (-1.61)
Farm capital -0.041∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗
(-4.12) (-3.21)
Manufacturing capital 0.0052 0.0056
(0.96) (1.03)
County fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 21,057 21,057
R2 0.019 0.022
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3: The Impact of New Orleans Silver Coinage on National Bank Formation
(1) (2)
New National Banks New National Banks
All silver (New Orleans only) -0.00026
(-0.95)
Lawful silver (New Orleans only) 0.0015∗∗∗
(9.21)
Initial national banks -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(-18.46) (-18.87)
Industrial production index 0.019∗∗ 0.015∗
(2.17) (1.95)
Population 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(9.58) (9.12)
Percent urban -0.039 -0.056
(-1.09) (-1.55)
Farm capital -0.030∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗
(-3.55) (-2.37)
Manufacturing capital 0.0020 0.0040
(0.46) (0.90)
County fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 23,066 23,066
R2 0.018 0.022
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 4: The Impact of San Francisco Silver Coinage on National Bank Formation
(1) (2)
New National Banks New National Banks
All silver (San Francisco only) -0.015∗∗
(-1.97)
Lawful silver (San Francisco only) 0.00058
(0.69)
Initial national banks -0.19∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗
(-4.76) (-4.98)
Industrial production index 0.0052 0.077
(0.09) (1.54)
Population 0.071 0.028
(1.23) (0.47)
Percent urban -0.27 -0.31∗
(-1.56) (-1.79)
Farm capital 0.040 0.030
(1.52) (1.08)
Manufacturing capital -0.036∗ -0.033
(-1.74) (-1.58)
County fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 435 435
R2 0.071 0.064
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 5: The Impact of Silver Coinage on National Bank Formation, by Proximity to Mint
(1) (2)
New National Banks New National Banks
Lawful silver (nearest mint only) 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗
(12.94) (7.21)
Proximity to nearest mint 0.024 0.0050
(0.66) (0.14)
Lawful silver (nearest mint only) * proximity 0.0014∗∗∗
(3.02)
Initial national banks -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(-21.39) (-21.36)
Industrial production index 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(2.51) (2.49)
Population 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(11.12) (11.09)
Percent urban -0.052∗ -0.050
(-1.68) (-1.64)
Farm capital -0.0074 -0.0065
(-1.02) (-0.89)
Manufacturing capital 0.00058 0.00060
(0.18) (0.19)
County fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 31,689 31,689
R2 0.022 0.022
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 6: Alternate Specifications for the Timing of Silver Coinage
Dependent Variable: New National Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Current Year One Year Lag
Lawful silver 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗
(12.97) (7.23) (13.10) (7.28)
Proximity to nearest mint 0.024 0.0049 0.019 0.00023
(0.66) (0.13) (0.52) (0.01)
Lawful silver * proximity 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗
(3.03) (3.03)
Initial national banks -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(-21.38) (-21.35) (-21.35) (-21.31)
Industrial production index 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(2.52) (2.50) (2.85) (2.84)
Population 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(11.12) (11.09) (11.23) (11.20)
Percent urban -0.051∗ -0.050 -0.077∗∗ -0.076∗∗
(-1.68) (-1.64) (-2.46) (-2.42)
Farm capital -0.0073 -0.0063 -0.0063 -0.0056
(-1.01) (-0.88) (-0.85) (-0.75)
Manufacturing capital 0.00056 0.00058 0.0012 0.0012
(0.17) (0.18) (0.37) (0.38)
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 31,689 31,689 31,163 31,163
R2 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 7: Silver Coinage and Bank Formation with Time Fixed Effects
Dependent Variable: New National Banks
(1) (2) (3)
Cumulative Current One Year Lag
Lawful silver * proximity 0.00082∗∗ 0.00087∗∗ 0.00092∗∗
(1.97) (1.98) (2.05)
Initial national banks -0.10∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗
(-20.41) (-20.40) (-20.35)
Population 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(10.35) (10.35) (10.27)
Percent urban 0.038 0.038 0.014
(1.27) (1.27) (0.46)
Farm Capital -0.0099 -0.0099 -0.0091
(-1.41) (-1.41) (-1.27)
Manufacturing Capital 0.0054∗ 0.0054∗ 0.0062∗
(1.70) (1.69) (1.91)
County fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 32,591 32,591 32,061
R2 0.045 0.045 0.045
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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